Stream-link tokens were AES-CBC with a fixed IV and no MAC. A modified token
decrypts to modified bytes, and a padding error answers differently from a bad
credential (auth.php: BAD_TOKEN vs everything after), so with enough requests
anyone holding a link could read its username and password, or write a token of
their own. Several consumers trust a token's contents as they stand: the live /
vod / timeshift JSON (user_info, channel_info), HLS segment and key tokens, the
web player's proxy URL (fetched server-side) and the MAG portal's verify token
(passed to igbinary_unserialize).
Encryption::seal()/open() add AES-256-GCM with a random nonce, as
base64url(nonce ‖ ciphertext ‖ tag) — the same URL-safe alphabet, so no nginx
route or pattern changes. Every stream-link token is now made with
mintToken() and read with readToken(); StreamTokenCallSitesTest keeps new code
from calling the legacy encrypt()/decrypt() for one. Deterministic encryption
of stored data (HMAC keys looked up by ciphertext, image cache names) stays as
it was.
The new setting secure_stream_tokens (Settings → Tamper-proof Stream Tokens):
- on: tokens are sealed, and the legacy format is refused wherever a token's
contents are trusted. /play/ playlist and portal links, RTMP tokens and
probe's /play/ links still read the old format — they carry credentials that
are looked up again, and saved playlists hold them — and every token auth.php
cannot read now counts against the address (BruteforceGuard), which stops
reading an old one through the error responses.
- off: legacy tokens are minted and every format is read.
Servers on an older version cannot read sealed tokens, so migration 021 turns it
off on a panel that has other servers (on for a single server, and for new
installs); turn it on once every server is updated.
key.php now also refuses a token that does not read, instead of serving the key
of stream 0.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BbYsGKhirq9eRK8e6wsCHR
