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Stream-link tokens were AES-CBC with a fixed IV and no MAC. A modified token decrypts to modified bytes, and a padding error answers differently from a bad credential (auth.php: BAD_TOKEN vs everything after), so with enough requests anyone holding a link could read its username and password, or write a token of their own. Several consumers trust a token's contents as they stand: the live / vod / timeshift JSON (user_info, channel_info), HLS segment and key tokens, the web player's proxy URL (fetched server-side) and the MAG portal's verify token (passed to igbinary_unserialize). Encryption::seal()/open() add AES-256-GCM with a random nonce, as base64url(nonce ‖ ciphertext ‖ tag) — the same URL-safe alphabet, so no nginx route or pattern changes. Every stream-link token is now made with mintToken() and read with readToken(); StreamTokenCallSitesTest keeps new code from calling the legacy encrypt()/decrypt() for one. Deterministic encryption of stored data (HMAC keys looked up by ciphertext, image cache names) stays as it was. The new setting secure_stream_tokens (Settings → Tamper-proof Stream Tokens): - on: tokens are sealed, and the legacy format is refused wherever a token's contents are trusted. /play/ playlist and portal links, RTMP tokens and probe's /play/ links still read the old format — they carry credentials that are looked up again, and saved playlists hold them — and every token auth.php cannot read now counts against the address (BruteforceGuard), which stops reading an old one through the error responses. - off: legacy tokens are minted and every format is read. Servers on an older version cannot read sealed tokens, so migration 021 turns it off on a panel that has other servers (on for a single server, and for new installs); turn it on once every server is updated. key.php now also refuses a token that does not read, instead of serving the key of stream 0. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BbYsGKhirq9eRK8e6wsCHR
41 lines
1.6 KiB
PHP
41 lines
1.6 KiB
PHP
<?php
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use PHPUnit\Framework\TestCase;
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/**
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* Stream-link tokens go through Encryption::mintToken / readToken, which seal
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* them when secure_stream_tokens is on. Calling the legacy encrypt()/decrypt()
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* directly for a token quietly brings back the format that can be read and
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* forged through padding errors, so only the uses that are not stream links —
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* deterministic encryption of stored data — may do that.
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*/
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final class StreamTokenCallSitesTest extends TestCase {
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/** Stored data that must stay deterministic: HMAC keys are looked up by ciphertext, image cache names are reversed by the self-heal. */
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private const LEGACY_ALLOWED = array(
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'Core/Auth/AuthService.php',
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'Core/Util/Encryption.php',
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'Core/Util/ImageUtils.php',
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'Cli/Commands/ToolsCommand.php',
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);
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public function testOnlyStoredDataUsesTheLegacyCipherDirectly(): void {
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$rRoot = dirname(__DIR__, 2) . '/src/';
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$rOffenders = array();
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$rIterator = new RecursiveIteratorIterator(new RecursiveDirectoryIterator($rRoot, FilesystemIterator::SKIP_DOTS));
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foreach ($rIterator as $rFile) {
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$rPath = $rFile->getPathname();
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if (substr($rPath, -4) !== '.php' || strpos($rPath, '/vendor/') !== false) {
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continue;
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}
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$rRelative = substr($rPath, strlen($rRoot));
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if (in_array($rRelative, self::LEGACY_ALLOWED, true)) {
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continue;
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}
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if (preg_match('/Encryption::(encrypt|decrypt)\s*\(/', (string) file_get_contents($rPath))) {
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$rOffenders[] = $rRelative;
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}
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}
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$this->assertSame(array(), $rOffenders, 'use Encryption::mintToken / readToken for stream-link tokens');
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}
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}
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