Files
Stirling-PDF/.github/workflows/_runner-pick.yml
T
dependabot[bot]andGitHub c61ff79e6e build(deps): bump step-security/harden-runner from 2.19.3 to 2.20.0
Bumps [step-security/harden-runner](https://github.com/step-security/harden-runner) from 2.19.3 to 2.20.0.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/step-security/harden-runner/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/step-security/harden-runner/compare/ab7a9404c0f3da075243ca237b5fac12c98deaa5...bf7454d06d71f1098171f2acdf0cd4708d7b5920)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: step-security/harden-runner
  dependency-version: 2.19.4
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
2026-07-15 15:23:32 +00:00

95 lines
3.4 KiB
YAML

name: _runner-pick
# Tiny reusable workflow that classifies the trigger as either a "fork PR
# from an untrusted contributor" or a "trusted commit" so downstream jobs
# can pick a runner class without each one duplicating the 200-char gate
# expression in their own `runs-on:`.
#
# It also owns the single Depot kill-switch (use_depot). Depot is currently
# disabled repo-wide; downstream jobs gate their Depot runner/build usage on
# use_depot so nothing has to be deleted to turn Depot off. Flip DEPOT_ENABLED
# in the decide step to switch Depot back on.
#
# Caller pattern:
#
# jobs:
# pick:
# uses: ./.github/workflows/_runner-pick.yml
#
# real-work:
# needs: pick
# runs-on: ${{ needs.pick.outputs.use_depot == 'true' && 'depot-ubuntu-24.04-8' || 'ubuntu-latest' }}
# steps: [...]
#
# Outputs:
# is_fork: "true" when the trigger is a pull_request from a fork or an
# untrusted author_association, "false" otherwise. Use this for
# trust gating (skipping secret-dependent jobs on forks).
# use_depot: "true" when downstream jobs should use Depot runners/builders.
# Currently forced "false" (Depot disabled repo-wide).
on:
workflow_call:
outputs:
is_fork:
description: '"true" if the trigger is an untrusted fork PR.'
value: ${{ jobs.pick.outputs.is_fork }}
use_depot:
description: '"true" when downstream jobs should use Depot. Currently forced off.'
value: ${{ jobs.pick.outputs.use_depot }}
permissions:
contents: read
jobs:
pick:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 1
outputs:
is_fork: ${{ steps.decide.outputs.is_fork }}
use_depot: ${{ steps.decide.outputs.use_depot }}
steps:
- name: Harden the runner (Audit all outbound calls)
uses: step-security/harden-runner@bf7454d06d71f1098171f2acdf0cd4708d7b5920 # v2.20.0
with:
egress-policy: audit
- name: Classify the trigger
id: decide
env:
PR_NUMBER: ${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}
HEAD_REPO_FORK: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.repo.fork }}
AUTHOR_ASSOC: ${{ github.event.pull_request.author_association }}
run: |
set -eu
# Depot kill-switch. Depot is disabled repo-wide: no job uses Depot
# runners or the Depot build actions while this is false. All the
# Depot wiring is left in place - set DEPOT_ENABLED=true to switch it
# back on (it then activates on trusted, non-fork triggers as before).
DEPOT_ENABLED=false
if [ -z "${PR_NUMBER:-}" ]; then
# Not a pull_request event at all (push, schedule, workflow_dispatch,
# workflow_call from a non-PR trigger) -> trusted by default.
is_fork=false
elif [ "${HEAD_REPO_FORK}" = "true" ]; then
is_fork=true
else
case "${AUTHOR_ASSOC}" in
OWNER|MEMBER|COLLABORATOR) is_fork=false ;;
*) is_fork=true ;;
esac
fi
# Depot only ever ran on trusted triggers, so gate it on both the
# kill-switch and is_fork.
if [ "${DEPOT_ENABLED}" = "true" ] && [ "${is_fork}" = "false" ]; then
use_depot=true
else
use_depot=false
fi
echo "is_fork=${is_fork}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "use_depot=${use_depot}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"