package fbhttp import ( "net/http" "net/http/httptest" "os" "path/filepath" "testing" "time" "github.com/asdine/storm/v3" "github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5" "github.com/spf13/afero" "github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2/diskcache" "github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2/settings" "github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2/storage/bolt" "github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2/users" ) func TestResourceCopyDoesNotDereferenceEscapingSymlink(t *testing.T) { root := t.TempDir() userScope := filepath.Join(root, "user") if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Join(userScope, "srcdir"), 0o755); err != nil { t.Fatal(err) } // An ordinary in-scope file, to prove a normal copy still works. if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(userScope, "srcdir", "normal.txt"), []byte("in-scope"), 0o644); err != nil { t.Fatal(err) } // The secret living outside the user's scope. secret := filepath.Join(root, "secret.txt") if err := os.WriteFile(secret, []byte("OUT-OF-SCOPE-SECRET"), 0o644); err != nil { t.Fatal(err) } // An escaping symlink planted inside the user's scope (out-of-band, as the // advisory's preconditions describe). if err := os.Symlink(secret, filepath.Join(userScope, "srcdir", "link.txt")); err != nil { t.Skipf("cannot create symlink: %v", err) } key := []byte("test-signing-key") db, err := storm.Open(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "db")) if err != nil { t.Fatalf("failed to open db: %v", err) } t.Cleanup(func() { _ = db.Close() }) st, err := bolt.NewStorage(db) if err != nil { t.Fatalf("failed to get storage: %v", err) } perm := users.Permissions{Create: true, Modify: true, Download: true, Rename: true} if err := st.Users.Save(&users.User{Username: "u", Password: "pw", Perm: perm}); err != nil { t.Fatalf("failed to save user: %v", err) } if err := st.Settings.Save(&settings.Settings{Key: key}); err != nil { t.Fatalf("failed to save settings: %v", err) } // The user's scope is the real on-disk userScope. customFSUser.Get wraps it // in a ScopedFs, mirroring production (users.User init). st.Users = &customFSUser{ Store: st.Users, fs: afero.NewBasePathFs(afero.NewOsFs(), userScope), } signed := signToken(t, perm, key) t.Run("direct raw read is forbidden", func(t *testing.T) { req, _ := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/srcdir/link.txt", http.NoBody) req.Header.Set("X-Auth", signed) rec := httptest.NewRecorder() handle(rawHandler, "", st, &settings.Server{}).ServeHTTP(rec, req) if rec.Code == http.StatusOK { t.Fatalf("VULNERABLE: direct raw read of escaping symlink returned 200, body=%q", rec.Body.String()) } }) t.Run("recursive copy does not exfiltrate", func(t *testing.T) { req, _ := http.NewRequest(http.MethodPatch, "/srcdir/", http.NoBody) q := req.URL.Query() q.Set("action", "copy") q.Set("destination", "/dstdir") req.URL.RawQuery = q.Encode() req.Header.Set("X-Auth", signed) rec := httptest.NewRecorder() handle(resourcePatchHandler(diskcache.NewNoOp()), "", st, &settings.Server{}).ServeHTTP(rec, req) t.Logf("copy status=%d body=%q", rec.Code, rec.Body.String()) // The escaping symlink's target content must never appear in scope. leaked := filepath.Join(userScope, "dstdir", "link.txt") if data, readErr := os.ReadFile(leaked); readErr == nil { t.Fatalf("VULNERABLE: out-of-scope content landed in scope at %s: %q", leaked, string(data)) } }) } func signToken(t *testing.T, perm users.Permissions, key []byte) string { t.Helper() claims := &authToken{ User: userInfo{ID: 1, Username: "u", Perm: perm}, RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{ IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(-time.Minute)), ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(time.Hour)), }, } signed, err := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodHS256, claims).SignedString(key) if err != nil { t.Fatalf("failed to sign token: %v", err) } return signed }