Homelable could only own the root of an origin. Behind an existing proxy
at `https://home.example/homelab/` the built `index.html` still asked for
`/assets/*`, which fell through to whatever owned the root — and when
that answered `text/html` for a `<script>` under `nosniff`, the browser
failed the load on an HTTP 200. The only workaround was patching the
checkout and rebuilding on every upgrade.
One build-time knob, `VITE_BASE_PATH`, becomes Vite's `base`. Vite
rewrites the asset URLs it emits; everything the app builds by hand goes
through the new `utils/basePath.ts` — the axios instances, the WebSocket
URL, the live-view route, the local brand icons, and the OIDC login href.
`resolveServerPath` covers what the *backend* hands back, which is always
root-absolute because it cannot know where the SPA is mounted: uploaded
floor-plan URLs already stored in a canvas are resolved at render time,
so plans predating the move keep loading. The OIDC callback used to
redirect to `/`, dropping subpath users at the origin root after login;
it now reads the prefix back out of `OIDC_REDIRECT_URI`.
The default is `/`, and stays a no-op there by construction: every helper
returns the string it returned before, the root build output is unchanged
and both nginx sites are byte-identical to what shipped — the Docker
image copies `docker/nginx.conf` verbatim and the installer keeps its
original heredoc. Only a non-default prefix takes the generated config.
Those generated configs use `root`, never `alias`, since `alias` plus
`try_files` mis-resolves `$uri` — the Docker build lands the bundle in
the matching subdirectory, and the installer symlinks it under
`/var/www/homelable`. Both accept either reverse-proxy style, prefix
forwarded intact or already stripped, with no redirect loop between them,
and `absolute_redirect off` stops the no-slash 301 from eating the port.
Closes#334.
ha-relevant: maybe
The default compose files put the backend on a bridge network, where ARP
only ever reaches the Docker gateway — so scans report IPs, ports and
services but never a MAC. NET_RAW does not help: it grants raw sockets,
not a place on the LAN. Rescan matching prefers MAC over IP, so this also
makes a DHCP device reappear as a new inventory entry when its lease
changes.
None of this was documented anywhere. Adds an INSTALLATION.md section
covering the network_mode: host fix, the Docker Desktop macOS/Windows
limitation and the macvlan alternative, a pointer from the README scanner
section, and a commented-out network_mode: host in both compose files so
it is a one-line change.
Reported in discussion #368.
ha-relevant: no
CORS_ORIGINS was hardcoded in docker-compose.yml, silently overriding .env
and breaking login for users who change the frontend port. It now comes
from .env exclusively, with a clear comment in .env.example.
Login page now distinguishes network errors (CORS/offline) from wrong
credentials, and footer correctly references .env instead of config.yml.
Tier 1 — quality.yml: ShellCheck on lxc-install.sh, hadolint on both Dockerfiles
Tier 2 — docker-ci.yml: build images, smoke-test backend health + frontend 200
Tier 3 — test_integration.py: full stack pytest (auth, canvas save/reload, dimensions)
Also adds Docker healthcheck to backend service in docker-compose.yml
Exposes homelab topology to MCP-compatible AI clients (Claude Code, etc.)
over LAN via HTTP/SSE on port 8001.
- New mcp/ service: FastAPI + mcp SDK, SSE transport
- Auth: X-API-Key for AI clients, X-MCP-Service-Key for backend (Docker-internal)
- Resources: canvas, nodes, edges, scan/pending, scan/runs
- Tools: create/update/delete nodes+edges, trigger scan, approve/hide devices
- Backend deps.py: accepts JWT or MCP service key (no plain-text password)
- 40 tests (auth, resources, tools) across asyncio + trio
- docker-compose.yml: mcp service on port 8001
- README: MCP setup section with Claude Code/Desktop config examples
All settings (auth credentials, scanner ranges, status_checker interval)
now live in a single .env file via pydantic-settings. config.yml and
config.yml.example are deleted.
- Settings: add auth_username, auth_password_hash, scanner_ranges,
status_checker_interval; add load_overrides()/save_overrides() for
persisting runtime changes to data/scan_config.json
- auth.py: read credentials directly from settings
- scan.py: read ranges/interval from settings; write-back via save_overrides()
- scheduler.py: read interval directly from settings
- main.py: call settings.load_overrides() at startup
- docker-compose.yml: remove config.yml volume mount, add new env vars
- conftest.py: set settings fields directly instead of writing a temp config.yml
C2 - JWT token was stored in localStorage (XSS-accessible):
- Switch Zustand persist storage from localStorage to sessionStorage
- Token is now scoped to the current tab and cleared on browser close
H5 - docker-compose had unsafe SECRET_KEY fallback:
- Replace ${SECRET_KEY:-change_me_in_production} with :? syntax
- Docker Compose now aborts with a clear error if SECRET_KEY is unset
M1 - Login endpoint had timing leak allowing username enumeration:
- Always call verify_password() regardless of username match
- Use hmac.compare_digest() for constant-time username comparison
- Both checks run every time; attacker cannot distinguish wrong
username from wrong password via response timing
Pouzor