* feat(observability): OpenTelemetry logs+traces with secret redaction
Part of #265. Adds opt-in OpenTelemetry (logs + traces) alongside the existing
stderr + opslog pipeline, plus secret redaction on all sinks. Default-off: with
no OTEL_* / SILO_OTEL_ENABLED config, behavior is unchanged.
Bootstrap (internal/telemetry):
- Setup() builds one shared resource, a TracerProvider (parent-based trace-id
ratio sampler), a LoggerProvider, and the W3C TraceContext+Baggage propagator
from env. It installs NO MeterProvider — metrics stay on Prometheus, and the
built-in no-op global MeterProvider keeps the trace instrumentation libs from
double-emitting. Shutdown is deferred with a flush timeout.
- Logs are bridged via otelslog fan-out (slog.MultiHandler), level-gated by the
shared LevelVar and best-effort so a failing collector can't break the console
or DB branches. stderr + opslog stay untouched.
Secret redaction (internal/logredact):
- A slog.Handler masks secret-keyed attributes (password, token, api_key,
authorization, cookie, ...) — including .With-bound attrs, nested groups,
secret-keyed group subtrees, and values behind a LogValuer — on the console
and OTLP sinks, with a no-op fast path when a record has no secret keys.
opslog.shouldRedact delegates to logredact.SecretKey so all sinks share one
marker list.
Rotation is infra-managed (no custom file sink): container runtime for stderr,
collector/backend for OTLP, opslog partition-pruning for the DB. Documented in
docs/architecture/observability.md.
Verification: go build ./..., go vet, gofmt -l — clean; go test
./internal/telemetry/ ./internal/logredact/ -race pass.
AI-use disclosure: implemented with AI assistance (Claude Code), including
adversarial reviews that hardened the bootstrap and fixed two redaction leak
paths; reviewed by the author.
* refactor(observability): slog context+component sweep, sloglint gate (phase 3)
Part of #265. Builds on the OTel bootstrap + redaction commit.
Standardizes every log call site onto the context-carrying slog variants so
records correlate with the active OpenTelemetry trace, and locks the standard
in with a machine gate so future code (human- or AI-authored) can't drift back.
- Call-site sweep: converted the remaining slog.<Level>(...) calls to the
slog.<Level>Context(ctx, ...) form wherever a context.Context is in scope
(background/init calls with no ctx are left as-is), across 183 files. Applied
via a type-aware AST codemod. Log levels and message strings are preserved
verbatim; a component attr (canonical per-package name) is added to direct
package-level slog calls. Bound-logger calls keep their existing .With
bindings. The main.go and telemetry package conversions rode with their file
in the previous commit to keep each file within a single commit.
- Enforcement (.golangci.yml): enable sloglint with context=scope, static-msg,
key-naming-case=snake, no-mixed-args. After the sweep all four report zero
violations repo-wide (tests included), so make lint / CI now blocks any
regression to the non-context form. The gate ships with the sweep because it
cannot be green until the legacy sites are converted.
Metrics remain on Prometheus; no behavior change to /metrics or Grafana.
Verification: go build ./..., go vet ./..., gofmt -l — clean; sloglint (all 4
rules) 0 violations repo-wide; log levels verified unchanged.
AI-use disclosure: implemented with AI assistance (Claude Code), including the
codemod; reviewed by the author.
* fix(observability): honor per-signal OTLP protocol and secret WithGroup names
Two Codex review findings on PR #290:
- telemetry: OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_{TRACES,LOGS}_PROTOCOL now override the
generic OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_PROTOCOL per signal, so mixed collector
setups (e.g. HTTP logs + gRPC traces) build the right exporter.
- logredact: entering a group whose name is secret-bearing (e.g.
WithGroup("authorization")) now masks every leaf in that subtree,
matching how slog.Group("authorization", ...) is masked as a whole.
* fix(observability): address review feedback on telemetry bootstrap
- Telemetry setup failure no longer kills boot: Setup returns usable
no-op providers alongside the error and main logs and continues with
telemetry disabled, honoring the best-effort contract.
- Honor OTEL_TRACES_SAMPLER (always_on/off, traceidratio, parentbased_*
variants); unsupported values fall back to parentbased_traceidratio.
- Attach node identity as semconv service.instance.id instead of the
non-semconv node.name.
- Rename opslog retention-scope log attrs to target_component/target_level
so they no longer collide with the canonical component routing key, and
tag those lines with component=opslog.
- Fix stale levelGated comment casing; use WarnContext in the telemetry
shutdown defer; document the LogValuer double-resolve on the redaction
slow path.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Quick <31828688+Quick104@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(security): encrypt server-owned credentials at rest
Introduce AES-256-GCM at-rest encryption (HKDF-derived from a required
SECRET_KEY) for server-owned credentials, with row-bound AAD, a versioned
enc:v1: envelope, and an idempotent startup backfill.
- internal/secret: cipher + RowAAD/SettingsAAD + the startup backfill engine.
- SECRET_KEY required at bootstrap; cipher threaded as an explicit dependency.
- server_settings: EncryptedSettingsRepo decorator over the audited
SensitiveSettingKeys (also drives admin redaction); the config watcher and
watch-sync settings reads decrypt too.
- Arr keys inline-encrypted; the ambiguous SecretResolver indirection removed
from requests/autoscan.
- Per-table columns encrypted: subtitles, watch-sync, webhook-sync (not
webhook_secret), history-import, and the jellycompat session's bridged Silo
access/refresh tokens.
- Startup backfill (resolve-then-encrypt for arr refs) is best-effort and
primary-node gated.
Equality-looked-up secrets and plugin_runtime_configs.config_value are out of
scope (need hashing / cross-repo design) — see
docs/architecture/secret-encryption.md.
Refs #45
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore(compose): require SECRET_KEY in docker-compose
The server now fatals without SECRET_KEY, so the integrated service (and the
commented distributed proxy/transcode examples) pass it through with a
fail-fast guard matching the existing MEDIA_ROOT pattern. Distributed worker
nodes must use the SAME key as the primary to decrypt shared data.
Generate with: openssl rand -base64 48.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(security): encrypt history import session credentials
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Rename actor-oriented API, storage, and webhook fields to user/profile terminology
- Switch dev compose helpers to use docker-compose.yml
- Update frontend types and webhook sync settings for the new endpoints
