* feat(security): encrypt server-owned credentials at rest
Introduce AES-256-GCM at-rest encryption (HKDF-derived from a required
SECRET_KEY) for server-owned credentials, with row-bound AAD, a versioned
enc:v1: envelope, and an idempotent startup backfill.
- internal/secret: cipher + RowAAD/SettingsAAD + the startup backfill engine.
- SECRET_KEY required at bootstrap; cipher threaded as an explicit dependency.
- server_settings: EncryptedSettingsRepo decorator over the audited
SensitiveSettingKeys (also drives admin redaction); the config watcher and
watch-sync settings reads decrypt too.
- Arr keys inline-encrypted; the ambiguous SecretResolver indirection removed
from requests/autoscan.
- Per-table columns encrypted: subtitles, watch-sync, webhook-sync (not
webhook_secret), history-import, and the jellycompat session's bridged Silo
access/refresh tokens.
- Startup backfill (resolve-then-encrypt for arr refs) is best-effort and
primary-node gated.
Equality-looked-up secrets and plugin_runtime_configs.config_value are out of
scope (need hashing / cross-repo design) — see
docs/architecture/secret-encryption.md.
Refs #45
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore(compose): require SECRET_KEY in docker-compose
The server now fatals without SECRET_KEY, so the integrated service (and the
commented distributed proxy/transcode examples) pass it through with a
fail-fast guard matching the existing MEDIA_ROOT pattern. Distributed worker
nodes must use the SAME key as the primary to decrypt shared data.
Generate with: openssl rand -base64 48.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(security): encrypt history import session credentials
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Rename actor-oriented API, storage, and webhook fields to user/profile terminology
- Switch dev compose helpers to use docker-compose.yml
- Update frontend types and webhook sync settings for the new endpoints
