Files
silo-server/internal/jellycompat/auth_api_key.go
e56a1b3e03 fix(api): throttle api_keys last_used_at writes in auth middleware (#381)
* fix(api): throttle api_keys last_used_at writes in auth middleware

Every API key request spawned a goroutine that ran an UPDATE on
api_keys, so a key driving HLS segments or a polling integration hit the
table with one write per request, and a stalled database could pile
those goroutines up without bound. The jellycompat authenticator already
guards this same write with a once-per-minute throttle per key; the main
middleware was missing it.

Bring the two in line. Track the last write per key ID and only launch
the update once a minute has passed, with a timeout on the background
write. The map is keyed by key ID so it stays bounded.

* fix(auth): bound API key last-used throttling

---------

Co-authored-by: Quick104 <31828688+Quick104@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-20 11:20:50 -04:00

313 lines
11 KiB
Go

package jellycompat
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
"github.com/Silo-Server/silo-server/internal/auth"
"github.com/Silo-Server/silo-server/internal/models"
"github.com/Silo-Server/silo-server/internal/userstore"
)
type adminAPIKeyContextKey string
const adminAPIKeyKey adminAPIKeyContextKey = "jellycompat_admin_api_key"
type apiKeyValidator interface {
GetByKey(ctx context.Context, key string) (*models.APIKey, error)
UpdateLastUsed(ctx context.Context, id int64) error
}
type apiKeyUserLoader interface {
GetByID(ctx context.Context, id int) (*models.User, error)
}
type AdminAPIKeyAuthenticator struct {
keys apiKeyValidator
users apiKeyUserLoader
provider userstore.UserStoreProvider
now func() time.Time
// profiles caches only the primary-profile lookup per user — never an
// authorization decision, which is re-checked on every request.
profiles *apiKeyProfileCache
apiKeyLastUsed *auth.APIKeyLastUsedTracker
}
type adminAPIKeyAuthResult struct {
ctx context.Context
status int
code string
message string
ok bool
}
// NewAdminAPIKeyAuthenticator builds the authenticator. keys and users are
// required (a nil return disables API-key auth entirely). provider is optional:
// when present, an admin key can synthesize a compat session (see
// resolveSession); when nil, only the admin-bool path (RequireAdminAPIKey /
// RequireSessionOrAdminAPIKey) is available.
func NewAdminAPIKeyAuthenticator(keys apiKeyValidator, users apiKeyUserLoader, provider userstore.UserStoreProvider, now func() time.Time) *AdminAPIKeyAuthenticator {
if keys == nil || users == nil {
return nil
}
if now == nil {
now = time.Now
}
return &AdminAPIKeyAuthenticator{
keys: keys,
users: users,
provider: provider,
now: now,
profiles: newAPIKeyProfileCache(),
apiKeyLastUsed: auth.NewAPIKeyLastUsedTracker(keys, now),
}
}
func AdminAPIKeyFromContext(ctx context.Context) bool {
ok, _ := ctx.Value(adminAPIKeyKey).(bool)
return ok
}
func (a *AdminAPIKeyAuthenticator) RequireAdminAPIKey(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
result := a.authenticate(r)
if !result.ok {
writeError(w, result.status, result.code, result.message)
return
}
next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(result.ctx))
})
}
func RequireSessionOrAdminAPIKey(sessionAuth *Authenticator, keyAuth *AdminAPIKeyAuthenticator) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
token, ok := ExtractToken(r)
if ok && strings.HasPrefix(token, "sa_") {
result := keyAuth.authenticate(r)
if !result.ok {
writeError(w, result.status, result.code, result.message)
return
}
next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(result.ctx))
return
}
sessionAuth.RequireSession(next).ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
}
// RequireSessionOrAPIKeySession authenticates either a compat session token or
// an sa_ admin API key. For an API key it injects a session synthesized for the
// key user's primary profile, so ordinary handlers (which read
// SessionFromContext) work unchanged for both auth modes — matching Jellyfin,
// where an API key authorizes the same endpoints a user token does. When
// API-key auth is unavailable (nil authenticator or no UserStoreProvider) an
// sa_ token falls through to session-token auth and is rejected there.
func RequireSessionOrAPIKeySession(sessionAuth *Authenticator, keyAuth *AdminAPIKeyAuthenticator) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if token, ok := ExtractToken(r); ok && strings.HasPrefix(token, "sa_") {
if session, result, handled := keyAuth.resolveSession(r.Context(), token); handled {
if !result.ok {
writeError(w, result.status, result.code, result.message)
return
}
serveWithSession(next, w, r, session)
return
}
}
sessionAuth.RequireSession(next).ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
}
// authenticate validates an admin API key and, on success, returns a result
// carrying the admin-API-key marker in context. Used by the server-to-server
// admin routes that act on the admin identity rather than a compat session.
func (a *AdminAPIKeyAuthenticator) authenticate(r *http.Request) adminAPIKeyAuthResult {
token, _ := ExtractToken(r)
apiKey, _, res := a.validate(r.Context(), token)
if !res.ok {
return res
}
a.apiKeyLastUsed.Touch(apiKey.ID)
return adminAPIKeyAuthResult{
ctx: context.WithValue(r.Context(), adminAPIKeyKey, true),
status: http.StatusOK,
ok: true,
}
}
// validate authenticates an admin API key by token and returns the key plus its
// owning admin user. The full authorization check — key lookup, user load,
// enabled, admin role — runs on EVERY call, so revocation (key deletion, user
// disable, role change) takes effect on the very next request. On failure the
// result carries the HTTP status/code/message: 401 for a missing/unknown/
// disabled key, 403 for a non-admin key.
func (a *AdminAPIKeyAuthenticator) validate(ctx context.Context, token string) (*models.APIKey, *models.User, adminAPIKeyAuthResult) {
unauthorized := adminAPIKeyAuthResult{
status: http.StatusUnauthorized,
code: "Unauthorized",
message: "Invalid API key",
}
if a == nil || a.keys == nil || a.users == nil {
return nil, nil, unauthorized
}
if !strings.HasPrefix(token, "sa_") {
return nil, nil, unauthorized
}
apiKey, err := a.keys.GetByKey(ctx, token)
if err != nil || apiKey == nil {
return nil, nil, unauthorized
}
user, err := a.users.GetByID(ctx, apiKey.UserID)
if err != nil || user == nil || !user.Enabled {
return nil, nil, unauthorized
}
if user.Role != "admin" {
return nil, nil, adminAPIKeyAuthResult{
status: http.StatusForbidden,
code: "Forbidden",
message: "Admin access required",
}
}
return apiKey, user, adminAPIKeyAuthResult{ok: true}
}
// resolveSession authenticates an sa_ API key and returns a compat session
// synthesized for the key user's primary profile, so ordinary browse/stream
// handlers (which read SessionFromContext) work unchanged for an API key.
//
// handled reports whether this authenticator can serve API-key session auth at
// all: false when the authenticator is nil or has no UserStoreProvider wired, in
// which case the caller must fall through to session-token auth. When handled is
// true, result.ok reports success; on failure result carries what to return.
//
// The key and owning user are re-validated on EVERY call (no cached
// authorization), so revocation is immediate. Only the primary-profile lookup is
// cached (see primaryProfile), sparing the hot path the ListProfiles round-trip.
func (a *AdminAPIKeyAuthenticator) resolveSession(ctx context.Context, token string) (*Session, adminAPIKeyAuthResult, bool) {
if a == nil || a.provider == nil {
return nil, adminAPIKeyAuthResult{}, false
}
apiKey, user, res := a.validate(ctx, token)
if !res.ok {
return nil, res, true
}
a.apiKeyLastUsed.Touch(apiKey.ID)
profile, err := a.primaryProfile(ctx, user.ID)
if err != nil {
slog.WarnContext(ctx, "jellycompat api key session synthesis failed", "component", "jellycompat", "user_id", user.ID, "error", err)
return nil, adminAPIKeyAuthResult{
status: http.StatusUnauthorized,
code: "Unauthorized",
message: "Unable to resolve a profile for this API key",
}, true
}
// Upstream Silo token fields are left empty and the expiry zero: an API key
// has no refreshable Silo token, and a zero expiry makes RequireSession's
// refresh path a no-op. Downstream services scope by StreamAppUserID/ProfileID.
return &Session{
Token: token,
Username: user.Username,
AccountUsername: user.Username,
ProfileID: profile.ID,
ProfileName: profile.Name,
PseudoUserID: PseudoUserID(user.ID, profile.ID),
StreamAppUserID: user.ID,
CreatedAt: a.now(),
}, adminAPIKeyAuthResult{ok: true}, true
}
// primaryProfile returns the account's primary profile, caching the result per
// user for apiKeyProfileCacheTTL. This caches profile DATA only — never an
// authorization decision — so it is safe against revocation (validated
// separately on every request).
func (a *AdminAPIKeyAuthenticator) primaryProfile(ctx context.Context, userID int) (userstore.Profile, error) {
if profile, ok := a.profiles.get(userID, a.now()); ok {
return profile, nil
}
store, err := a.provider.ForUser(ctx, userID)
if err != nil {
return userstore.Profile{}, fmt.Errorf("open user store for user %d: %w", userID, err)
}
profiles, err := store.ListProfiles(ctx)
if err != nil {
return userstore.Profile{}, fmt.Errorf("list profiles for user %d: %w", userID, err)
}
profile, err := selectPrimaryProfile(userID, profiles)
if err != nil {
return userstore.Profile{}, err
}
a.profiles.put(userID, profile, a.now().Add(apiKeyProfileCacheTTL))
return profile, nil
}
// selectPrimaryProfile returns the account's primary profile, falling back to
// the first profile (with a warning) when none is flagged primary, and erroring
// when the account has no profiles.
func selectPrimaryProfile(userID int, profiles []userstore.Profile) (userstore.Profile, error) {
if len(profiles) == 0 {
return userstore.Profile{}, fmt.Errorf("user %d has no profiles", userID)
}
for _, p := range profiles {
if p.IsPrimary {
return p, nil
}
}
slog.Warn("jellycompat api key: no primary profile found, using first",
"user_id", userID, "profile_id", profiles[0].ID)
return profiles[0], nil
}
const (
// apiKeyProfileCacheTTL bounds how long a primary-profile lookup is reused.
// Profiles are stable, so this is generous; it only affects how quickly a
// reassigned/renamed primary profile is picked up, never authorization
// (the key and user are re-validated on every request).
apiKeyProfileCacheTTL = 5 * time.Minute
)
type apiKeyProfileCacheEntry struct {
profile userstore.Profile
expiresAt time.Time
}
// apiKeyProfileCache caches the primary-profile lookup per user so the hot path
// (e.g. HLS segment requests) skips the ListProfiles round-trip. It caches only
// profile data, never an authorization decision.
type apiKeyProfileCache struct {
mu sync.RWMutex
entries map[int]apiKeyProfileCacheEntry
}
func newAPIKeyProfileCache() *apiKeyProfileCache {
return &apiKeyProfileCache{entries: make(map[int]apiKeyProfileCacheEntry)}
}
func (c *apiKeyProfileCache) get(userID int, now time.Time) (userstore.Profile, bool) {
c.mu.RLock()
entry, ok := c.entries[userID]
c.mu.RUnlock()
if !ok || !entry.expiresAt.After(now) {
return userstore.Profile{}, false
}
return entry.profile, true
}
func (c *apiKeyProfileCache) put(userID int, profile userstore.Profile, expiresAt time.Time) {
c.mu.Lock()
c.entries[userID] = apiKeyProfileCacheEntry{profile: profile, expiresAt: expiresAt}
c.mu.Unlock()
}