* feat(observability): OpenTelemetry logs+traces with secret redaction Part of #265. Adds opt-in OpenTelemetry (logs + traces) alongside the existing stderr + opslog pipeline, plus secret redaction on all sinks. Default-off: with no OTEL_* / SILO_OTEL_ENABLED config, behavior is unchanged. Bootstrap (internal/telemetry): - Setup() builds one shared resource, a TracerProvider (parent-based trace-id ratio sampler), a LoggerProvider, and the W3C TraceContext+Baggage propagator from env. It installs NO MeterProvider — metrics stay on Prometheus, and the built-in no-op global MeterProvider keeps the trace instrumentation libs from double-emitting. Shutdown is deferred with a flush timeout. - Logs are bridged via otelslog fan-out (slog.MultiHandler), level-gated by the shared LevelVar and best-effort so a failing collector can't break the console or DB branches. stderr + opslog stay untouched. Secret redaction (internal/logredact): - A slog.Handler masks secret-keyed attributes (password, token, api_key, authorization, cookie, ...) — including .With-bound attrs, nested groups, secret-keyed group subtrees, and values behind a LogValuer — on the console and OTLP sinks, with a no-op fast path when a record has no secret keys. opslog.shouldRedact delegates to logredact.SecretKey so all sinks share one marker list. Rotation is infra-managed (no custom file sink): container runtime for stderr, collector/backend for OTLP, opslog partition-pruning for the DB. Documented in docs/architecture/observability.md. Verification: go build ./..., go vet, gofmt -l — clean; go test ./internal/telemetry/ ./internal/logredact/ -race pass. AI-use disclosure: implemented with AI assistance (Claude Code), including adversarial reviews that hardened the bootstrap and fixed two redaction leak paths; reviewed by the author. * refactor(observability): slog context+component sweep, sloglint gate (phase 3) Part of #265. Builds on the OTel bootstrap + redaction commit. Standardizes every log call site onto the context-carrying slog variants so records correlate with the active OpenTelemetry trace, and locks the standard in with a machine gate so future code (human- or AI-authored) can't drift back. - Call-site sweep: converted the remaining slog.<Level>(...) calls to the slog.<Level>Context(ctx, ...) form wherever a context.Context is in scope (background/init calls with no ctx are left as-is), across 183 files. Applied via a type-aware AST codemod. Log levels and message strings are preserved verbatim; a component attr (canonical per-package name) is added to direct package-level slog calls. Bound-logger calls keep their existing .With bindings. The main.go and telemetry package conversions rode with their file in the previous commit to keep each file within a single commit. - Enforcement (.golangci.yml): enable sloglint with context=scope, static-msg, key-naming-case=snake, no-mixed-args. After the sweep all four report zero violations repo-wide (tests included), so make lint / CI now blocks any regression to the non-context form. The gate ships with the sweep because it cannot be green until the legacy sites are converted. Metrics remain on Prometheus; no behavior change to /metrics or Grafana. Verification: go build ./..., go vet ./..., gofmt -l — clean; sloglint (all 4 rules) 0 violations repo-wide; log levels verified unchanged. AI-use disclosure: implemented with AI assistance (Claude Code), including the codemod; reviewed by the author. * fix(observability): honor per-signal OTLP protocol and secret WithGroup names Two Codex review findings on PR #290: - telemetry: OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_{TRACES,LOGS}_PROTOCOL now override the generic OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_PROTOCOL per signal, so mixed collector setups (e.g. HTTP logs + gRPC traces) build the right exporter. - logredact: entering a group whose name is secret-bearing (e.g. WithGroup("authorization")) now masks every leaf in that subtree, matching how slog.Group("authorization", ...) is masked as a whole. * fix(observability): address review feedback on telemetry bootstrap - Telemetry setup failure no longer kills boot: Setup returns usable no-op providers alongside the error and main logs and continues with telemetry disabled, honoring the best-effort contract. - Honor OTEL_TRACES_SAMPLER (always_on/off, traceidratio, parentbased_* variants); unsupported values fall back to parentbased_traceidratio. - Attach node identity as semconv service.instance.id instead of the non-semconv node.name. - Rename opslog retention-scope log attrs to target_component/target_level so they no longer collide with the canonical component routing key, and tag those lines with component=opslog. - Fix stale levelGated comment casing; use WarnContext in the telemetry shutdown defer; document the LogValuer double-resolve on the redaction slow path. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Quick <31828688+Quick104@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
231 lines
6.4 KiB
Go
231 lines
6.4 KiB
Go
package ratelimit
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import (
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"fmt"
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"log/slog"
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"net/http"
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"strconv"
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"sync"
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"github.com/Silo-Server/silo-server/internal/auth"
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"github.com/Silo-Server/silo-server/internal/clientip"
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apimw "github.com/Silo-Server/silo-server/internal/api/middleware"
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)
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// Middleware manages rate limiting config, limiters, and the HTTP handler.
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type Middleware struct {
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mu sync.RWMutex
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cfg Config
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perKey RateLimiter
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global RateLimiter
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store SettingsStore
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isMemory bool
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}
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// NewMiddleware creates the rate limit middleware.
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func NewMiddleware(perKey RateLimiter, global RateLimiter, store SettingsStore, isMemory bool) *Middleware {
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return &Middleware{
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perKey: perKey,
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global: global,
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store: store,
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isMemory: isMemory,
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}
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}
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// ActiveBackend reports which limiter backend this process is actually
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// running, as opposed to the configured backend, which only takes effect
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// after a restart.
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func (mw *Middleware) ActiveBackend() string {
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if mw.isMemory {
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return "memory"
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}
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return "redis"
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}
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// Init loads config and seeds defaults. Call once at startup.
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func (mw *Middleware) Init(ctx context.Context) error {
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if err := SeedDefaults(ctx, mw.store); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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return mw.Reload(ctx)
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}
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// Reload re-reads config from server_settings and clears in-memory state.
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func (mw *Middleware) Reload(ctx context.Context) error {
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cfg, err := LoadConfig(ctx, mw.store)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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mw.mu.Lock()
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mw.cfg = cfg
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mw.mu.Unlock()
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if mw.isMemory {
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if ml, ok := mw.perKey.(*MemoryLimiter); ok {
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ml.Clear()
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}
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if ml, ok := mw.global.(*MemoryLimiter); ok {
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ml.Clear()
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}
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}
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slog.InfoContext(ctx, "rate limit config reloaded", "component", "ratelimit", "enabled", cfg.Enabled, "global_rps", cfg.GlobalReqPerSecond)
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return nil
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}
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// Handler returns the chi-compatible middleware handler.
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func (mw *Middleware) Handler(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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mw.mu.RLock()
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cfg := mw.cfg
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mw.mu.RUnlock()
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if !cfg.Enabled {
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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return
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}
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// Check global limiter (per-second only — spec says no per-minute global limit).
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// Setting RequestsPerMinute = RPS*60 makes the per-minute limiter a mathematical
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// no-op: it never triggers before the per-second limiter does.
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globalRate := Rate{
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RequestsPerSecond: cfg.GlobalReqPerSecond,
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RequestsPerMinute: cfg.GlobalReqPerSecond * 60,
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Burst: int(cfg.GlobalReqPerSecond),
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}
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globalResult := mw.global.Allow(r.Context(), "global", globalRate)
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if !globalResult.Allowed {
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writeRateLimitResponse(w, globalResult)
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return
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}
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// Check per-IP limiter
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if clientIP := clientip.FromContext(r.Context()); clientIP != "" {
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ipRate := Rate{
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RequestsPerSecond: cfg.IPReqPerSecond,
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RequestsPerMinute: cfg.IPReqPerMinute,
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Burst: cfg.IPBurst,
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}
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ipKey := "ip:" + clientIP
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ipResult := mw.perKey.Allow(r.Context(), ipKey, ipRate)
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if !ipResult.Allowed {
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writeRateLimitResponse(w, ipResult)
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return
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}
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}
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// Check per-key limiter (API key auth only)
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claims := apimw.GetClaims(r.Context())
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if claims != nil && claims.TokenType == auth.TokenTypeAPIKey && claims.APIKeyID != 0 {
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// RateTier is already on the claims — no DB lookup needed
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tier := claims.RateTier
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if tier == "" {
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tier = "standard"
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}
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tierCfg, ok := cfg.Tiers[tier]
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if !ok {
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tierCfg = cfg.Tiers["standard"]
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}
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keyRate := Rate{
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RequestsPerSecond: tierCfg.RequestsPerSecond,
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RequestsPerMinute: tierCfg.RequestsPerMinute,
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Burst: tierCfg.Burst,
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}
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key := fmt.Sprintf("key:%d", claims.APIKeyID)
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result := mw.perKey.Allow(r.Context(), key, keyRate)
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// Set rate limit headers on every API-key-authenticated response
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w.Header().Set("X-RateLimit-Limit", strconv.Itoa(result.Limit))
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if result.Remaining >= 0 {
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w.Header().Set("X-RateLimit-Remaining", strconv.Itoa(result.Remaining))
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}
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w.Header().Set("X-RateLimit-Reset", strconv.FormatInt(result.ResetAt.Unix(), 10))
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if !result.Allowed {
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writeRateLimitResponse(w, result)
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return
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}
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}
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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})
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}
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type rateLimitError struct {
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Error string `json:"error"`
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Message string `json:"message"`
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RetryAfter int `json:"retry_after"`
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}
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// AuthEndpointHandler returns middleware for IP-based rate limiting on auth endpoints.
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// It checks both the global per-IP limit and the tighter per-endpoint limit.
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func (mw *Middleware) AuthEndpointHandler(endpoint string) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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mw.mu.RLock()
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cfg := mw.cfg
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mw.mu.RUnlock()
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if !cfg.Enabled {
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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return
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}
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clientIP := clientip.FromContext(r.Context())
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if clientIP == "" {
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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return
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}
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// Check global per-IP limit (shared counter with authenticated routes)
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ipRate := Rate{
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RequestsPerSecond: cfg.IPReqPerSecond,
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RequestsPerMinute: cfg.IPReqPerMinute,
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Burst: cfg.IPBurst,
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}
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ipResult := mw.perKey.Allow(r.Context(), "ip:"+clientIP, ipRate)
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if !ipResult.Allowed {
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writeRateLimitResponse(w, ipResult)
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return
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}
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// Check per-endpoint limit
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epCfg, ok := cfg.AuthEndpoints[endpoint]
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if ok {
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epRate := Rate{
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RequestsPerSecond: epCfg.RequestsPerMinute / 60,
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RequestsPerMinute: epCfg.RequestsPerMinute,
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Burst: epCfg.Burst,
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}
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epKey := fmt.Sprintf("authip:%s:%s", clientIP, endpoint)
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epResult := mw.perKey.Allow(r.Context(), epKey, epRate)
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if !epResult.Allowed {
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writeRateLimitResponse(w, epResult)
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return
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}
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}
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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})
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}
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}
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func writeRateLimitResponse(w http.ResponseWriter, result AllowResult) {
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retrySeconds := int(result.RetryAfter.Seconds()) + 1
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w.Header().Set("Retry-After", strconv.Itoa(retrySeconds))
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w.Header().Set("X-RateLimit-Limit", strconv.Itoa(result.Limit))
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w.Header().Set("X-RateLimit-Remaining", "0")
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w.Header().Set("X-RateLimit-Reset", strconv.FormatInt(result.ResetAt.Unix(), 10))
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusTooManyRequests)
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_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(rateLimitError{
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Error: "rate_limit_exceeded",
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Message: fmt.Sprintf("Too many requests. Please retry after %d seconds.", retrySeconds),
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RetryAfter: retrySeconds,
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})
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}
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