Files
silo-server/internal/ratelimit/middleware.go
T
203a18ae83 feat(observability): OpenTelemetry logs+traces with secret redaction and slog standardization (#290)
* feat(observability): OpenTelemetry logs+traces with secret redaction

Part of #265. Adds opt-in OpenTelemetry (logs + traces) alongside the existing
stderr + opslog pipeline, plus secret redaction on all sinks. Default-off: with
no OTEL_* / SILO_OTEL_ENABLED config, behavior is unchanged.

Bootstrap (internal/telemetry):
- Setup() builds one shared resource, a TracerProvider (parent-based trace-id
  ratio sampler), a LoggerProvider, and the W3C TraceContext+Baggage propagator
  from env. It installs NO MeterProvider — metrics stay on Prometheus, and the
  built-in no-op global MeterProvider keeps the trace instrumentation libs from
  double-emitting. Shutdown is deferred with a flush timeout.
- Logs are bridged via otelslog fan-out (slog.MultiHandler), level-gated by the
  shared LevelVar and best-effort so a failing collector can't break the console
  or DB branches. stderr + opslog stay untouched.

Secret redaction (internal/logredact):
- A slog.Handler masks secret-keyed attributes (password, token, api_key,
  authorization, cookie, ...) — including .With-bound attrs, nested groups,
  secret-keyed group subtrees, and values behind a LogValuer — on the console
  and OTLP sinks, with a no-op fast path when a record has no secret keys.
  opslog.shouldRedact delegates to logredact.SecretKey so all sinks share one
  marker list.

Rotation is infra-managed (no custom file sink): container runtime for stderr,
collector/backend for OTLP, opslog partition-pruning for the DB. Documented in
docs/architecture/observability.md.

Verification: go build ./..., go vet, gofmt -l — clean; go test
./internal/telemetry/ ./internal/logredact/ -race pass.

AI-use disclosure: implemented with AI assistance (Claude Code), including
adversarial reviews that hardened the bootstrap and fixed two redaction leak
paths; reviewed by the author.

* refactor(observability): slog context+component sweep, sloglint gate (phase 3)

Part of #265. Builds on the OTel bootstrap + redaction commit.

Standardizes every log call site onto the context-carrying slog variants so
records correlate with the active OpenTelemetry trace, and locks the standard
in with a machine gate so future code (human- or AI-authored) can't drift back.

- Call-site sweep: converted the remaining slog.<Level>(...) calls to the
  slog.<Level>Context(ctx, ...) form wherever a context.Context is in scope
  (background/init calls with no ctx are left as-is), across 183 files. Applied
  via a type-aware AST codemod. Log levels and message strings are preserved
  verbatim; a component attr (canonical per-package name) is added to direct
  package-level slog calls. Bound-logger calls keep their existing .With
  bindings. The main.go and telemetry package conversions rode with their file
  in the previous commit to keep each file within a single commit.
- Enforcement (.golangci.yml): enable sloglint with context=scope, static-msg,
  key-naming-case=snake, no-mixed-args. After the sweep all four report zero
  violations repo-wide (tests included), so make lint / CI now blocks any
  regression to the non-context form. The gate ships with the sweep because it
  cannot be green until the legacy sites are converted.

Metrics remain on Prometheus; no behavior change to /metrics or Grafana.

Verification: go build ./..., go vet ./..., gofmt -l — clean; sloglint (all 4
rules) 0 violations repo-wide; log levels verified unchanged.

AI-use disclosure: implemented with AI assistance (Claude Code), including the
codemod; reviewed by the author.

* fix(observability): honor per-signal OTLP protocol and secret WithGroup names

Two Codex review findings on PR #290:

- telemetry: OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_{TRACES,LOGS}_PROTOCOL now override the
  generic OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_PROTOCOL per signal, so mixed collector
  setups (e.g. HTTP logs + gRPC traces) build the right exporter.
- logredact: entering a group whose name is secret-bearing (e.g.
  WithGroup("authorization")) now masks every leaf in that subtree,
  matching how slog.Group("authorization", ...) is masked as a whole.

* fix(observability): address review feedback on telemetry bootstrap

- Telemetry setup failure no longer kills boot: Setup returns usable
  no-op providers alongside the error and main logs and continues with
  telemetry disabled, honoring the best-effort contract.
- Honor OTEL_TRACES_SAMPLER (always_on/off, traceidratio, parentbased_*
  variants); unsupported values fall back to parentbased_traceidratio.
- Attach node identity as semconv service.instance.id instead of the
  non-semconv node.name.
- Rename opslog retention-scope log attrs to target_component/target_level
  so they no longer collide with the canonical component routing key, and
  tag those lines with component=opslog.
- Fix stale levelGated comment casing; use WarnContext in the telemetry
  shutdown defer; document the LogValuer double-resolve on the redaction
  slow path.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Quick <31828688+Quick104@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-09 08:53:52 -04:00

231 lines
6.4 KiB
Go

package ratelimit
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"strconv"
"sync"
"github.com/Silo-Server/silo-server/internal/auth"
"github.com/Silo-Server/silo-server/internal/clientip"
apimw "github.com/Silo-Server/silo-server/internal/api/middleware"
)
// Middleware manages rate limiting config, limiters, and the HTTP handler.
type Middleware struct {
mu sync.RWMutex
cfg Config
perKey RateLimiter
global RateLimiter
store SettingsStore
isMemory bool
}
// NewMiddleware creates the rate limit middleware.
func NewMiddleware(perKey RateLimiter, global RateLimiter, store SettingsStore, isMemory bool) *Middleware {
return &Middleware{
perKey: perKey,
global: global,
store: store,
isMemory: isMemory,
}
}
// ActiveBackend reports which limiter backend this process is actually
// running, as opposed to the configured backend, which only takes effect
// after a restart.
func (mw *Middleware) ActiveBackend() string {
if mw.isMemory {
return "memory"
}
return "redis"
}
// Init loads config and seeds defaults. Call once at startup.
func (mw *Middleware) Init(ctx context.Context) error {
if err := SeedDefaults(ctx, mw.store); err != nil {
return err
}
return mw.Reload(ctx)
}
// Reload re-reads config from server_settings and clears in-memory state.
func (mw *Middleware) Reload(ctx context.Context) error {
cfg, err := LoadConfig(ctx, mw.store)
if err != nil {
return err
}
mw.mu.Lock()
mw.cfg = cfg
mw.mu.Unlock()
if mw.isMemory {
if ml, ok := mw.perKey.(*MemoryLimiter); ok {
ml.Clear()
}
if ml, ok := mw.global.(*MemoryLimiter); ok {
ml.Clear()
}
}
slog.InfoContext(ctx, "rate limit config reloaded", "component", "ratelimit", "enabled", cfg.Enabled, "global_rps", cfg.GlobalReqPerSecond)
return nil
}
// Handler returns the chi-compatible middleware handler.
func (mw *Middleware) Handler(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
mw.mu.RLock()
cfg := mw.cfg
mw.mu.RUnlock()
if !cfg.Enabled {
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
return
}
// Check global limiter (per-second only — spec says no per-minute global limit).
// Setting RequestsPerMinute = RPS*60 makes the per-minute limiter a mathematical
// no-op: it never triggers before the per-second limiter does.
globalRate := Rate{
RequestsPerSecond: cfg.GlobalReqPerSecond,
RequestsPerMinute: cfg.GlobalReqPerSecond * 60,
Burst: int(cfg.GlobalReqPerSecond),
}
globalResult := mw.global.Allow(r.Context(), "global", globalRate)
if !globalResult.Allowed {
writeRateLimitResponse(w, globalResult)
return
}
// Check per-IP limiter
if clientIP := clientip.FromContext(r.Context()); clientIP != "" {
ipRate := Rate{
RequestsPerSecond: cfg.IPReqPerSecond,
RequestsPerMinute: cfg.IPReqPerMinute,
Burst: cfg.IPBurst,
}
ipKey := "ip:" + clientIP
ipResult := mw.perKey.Allow(r.Context(), ipKey, ipRate)
if !ipResult.Allowed {
writeRateLimitResponse(w, ipResult)
return
}
}
// Check per-key limiter (API key auth only)
claims := apimw.GetClaims(r.Context())
if claims != nil && claims.TokenType == auth.TokenTypeAPIKey && claims.APIKeyID != 0 {
// RateTier is already on the claims — no DB lookup needed
tier := claims.RateTier
if tier == "" {
tier = "standard"
}
tierCfg, ok := cfg.Tiers[tier]
if !ok {
tierCfg = cfg.Tiers["standard"]
}
keyRate := Rate{
RequestsPerSecond: tierCfg.RequestsPerSecond,
RequestsPerMinute: tierCfg.RequestsPerMinute,
Burst: tierCfg.Burst,
}
key := fmt.Sprintf("key:%d", claims.APIKeyID)
result := mw.perKey.Allow(r.Context(), key, keyRate)
// Set rate limit headers on every API-key-authenticated response
w.Header().Set("X-RateLimit-Limit", strconv.Itoa(result.Limit))
if result.Remaining >= 0 {
w.Header().Set("X-RateLimit-Remaining", strconv.Itoa(result.Remaining))
}
w.Header().Set("X-RateLimit-Reset", strconv.FormatInt(result.ResetAt.Unix(), 10))
if !result.Allowed {
writeRateLimitResponse(w, result)
return
}
}
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
type rateLimitError struct {
Error string `json:"error"`
Message string `json:"message"`
RetryAfter int `json:"retry_after"`
}
// AuthEndpointHandler returns middleware for IP-based rate limiting on auth endpoints.
// It checks both the global per-IP limit and the tighter per-endpoint limit.
func (mw *Middleware) AuthEndpointHandler(endpoint string) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
mw.mu.RLock()
cfg := mw.cfg
mw.mu.RUnlock()
if !cfg.Enabled {
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
return
}
clientIP := clientip.FromContext(r.Context())
if clientIP == "" {
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
return
}
// Check global per-IP limit (shared counter with authenticated routes)
ipRate := Rate{
RequestsPerSecond: cfg.IPReqPerSecond,
RequestsPerMinute: cfg.IPReqPerMinute,
Burst: cfg.IPBurst,
}
ipResult := mw.perKey.Allow(r.Context(), "ip:"+clientIP, ipRate)
if !ipResult.Allowed {
writeRateLimitResponse(w, ipResult)
return
}
// Check per-endpoint limit
epCfg, ok := cfg.AuthEndpoints[endpoint]
if ok {
epRate := Rate{
RequestsPerSecond: epCfg.RequestsPerMinute / 60,
RequestsPerMinute: epCfg.RequestsPerMinute,
Burst: epCfg.Burst,
}
epKey := fmt.Sprintf("authip:%s:%s", clientIP, endpoint)
epResult := mw.perKey.Allow(r.Context(), epKey, epRate)
if !epResult.Allowed {
writeRateLimitResponse(w, epResult)
return
}
}
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
}
func writeRateLimitResponse(w http.ResponseWriter, result AllowResult) {
retrySeconds := int(result.RetryAfter.Seconds()) + 1
w.Header().Set("Retry-After", strconv.Itoa(retrySeconds))
w.Header().Set("X-RateLimit-Limit", strconv.Itoa(result.Limit))
w.Header().Set("X-RateLimit-Remaining", "0")
w.Header().Set("X-RateLimit-Reset", strconv.FormatInt(result.ResetAt.Unix(), 10))
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusTooManyRequests)
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(rateLimitError{
Error: "rate_limit_exceeded",
Message: fmt.Sprintf("Too many requests. Please retry after %d seconds.", retrySeconds),
RetryAfter: retrySeconds,
})
}