diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index 739600d..4355c4c 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ To get started:
         -l ./android/android-proxy-override.js \
         -l ./android/android-system-certificate-injection.js \
         -l ./android/android-certificate-unpinning.js \
-        -l ./android/android-fallback-script.js \
+        -l ./android/android-certificate-unpinning-fallback.js \
         -f $PACKAGE_ID
     ```
 7. Explore, examine & modify all the traffic you're interested in! If you have any problems, please [open an issue](https://github.com/httptoolkit/frida-android-unpinning/issues/new) and help make these scripts even better.
diff --git a/android/android-fallback-script.js b/android/android-certificate-unpinning-fallback.js
similarity index 90%
rename from android/android-fallback-script.js
rename to android/android-certificate-unpinning-fallback.js
index b36b511..d808f3b 100644
--- a/android/android-fallback-script.js
+++ b/android/android-certificate-unpinning-fallback.js
@@ -1,22 +1,24 @@
-/**
- * Once we've set up the configuration and certificate, and then disabled all the
- * pinning techniques we're aware of, we add one last touch: a fallback hook,
- * designed to spot and handle unknown unknowns.
+/**************************************************************************************************
  *
- * This can also be useful for heavily obfuscated apps, where 3rd party libraries
- * are obfuscated sufficiently that our hooks no longer recognize the methods we
- * care about.
+ * Once we've set up the configuration and certificate, and then disabled all the pinning
+ * techniques we're aware of, we add one last touch: a fallback hook, designed to spot and handle
+ * unknown unknowns.
  *
- * To handle this, we watch for methods that throw known built-in TLS errors
- * (these are _very_ widely used, and always recognizable as they're defined natively),
- * and then subsequently patch them for all future calls. Whenever a method throws
- * this, we attempt to recognize it from signatures alone, and automatically hook it.
+ * This can also be useful for heavily obfuscated apps, where 3rd party libraries are obfuscated
+ * sufficiently that our hooks no longer recognize the methods we care about.
  *
- * These are very much a fallback! They might not work! They almost certainly won't
- * work on the first request, so applications will see at least one failure.
- * Even when they fail though, they will at least log the method that's failing, so
- * this works well as a starting point for manual reverse engineering.
- */
+ * To handle this, we watch for methods that throw known built-in TLS errors (these are *very*
+ * widely used, and always recognizable as they're defined natively), and then subsequently patch
+ * them for all future calls. Whenever a method throws this, we attempt to recognize it from
+ * signatures alone, and automatically hook it.
+ *
+ * These are very much a fallback! They might not work! They almost certainly won't work on the
+ * first request, so applications will see at least one failure. Even when they fail though, they
+ * will at least log the method that's failing, so this works well as a starting point for manual
+ * reverse engineering. If this does fail and cause problems, you may want to skip this script
+ * and use only the known-good patches provided elsewhere.
+ *
+ *************************************************************************************************/
 
 // Capture the full fields or methods from a Frida class reference via JVM reflection:
 const getFields = (cls) => getFridaValues(cls, cls.class.getDeclaredFields());
diff --git a/android/android-certificate-unpinning.js b/android/android-certificate-unpinning.js
index 5d4121c..ad54882 100644
--- a/android/android-certificate-unpinning.js
+++ b/android/android-certificate-unpinning.js
@@ -1,3 +1,24 @@
+/**************************************************************************************************
+ *
+ * This script defines a large set of targeted certificate unpinning hooks: matching specific
+ * methods in certain classes, and transforming their behaviour to ensure that restrictions to
+ * TLS trust are disabled.
+ *
+ * This does not disable TLS protections completely - each hook is designed to disable only
+ * *additional* restrictions, and to explicitly trust the certificate provided as CERT_PEM in the
+ * config.js configuration file, preserving normal TLS protections wherever possible, even while
+ * allowing for controlled MitM of local traffic.
+ *
+ * The file consists of a few general-purpose methods, then a data structure declaratively
+ * defining the classes & methods to match, and how to transform them, and then logic at the end
+ * which uses this data structure, applying the transformation for each found match to the
+ * target process.
+ *
+ * For more details on what was matched, and log output when each hooked method is actually used,
+ * enable DEBUG_MODE in config.js, and watch the Frida output after running this script.
+ *
+ *************************************************************************************************/
+
 function buildX509CertificateFromBytes(certBytes) {
     const ByteArrayInputStream = Java.use('java.io.ByteArrayInputStream');
     const CertFactory = Java.use('java.security.cert.CertificateFactory');
diff --git a/android/android-proxy-override.js b/android/android-proxy-override.js
index 4e5e9ca..b268c71 100644
--- a/android/android-proxy-override.js
+++ b/android/android-proxy-override.js
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
-/**
+/**************************************************************************************************
+ *
  * The first step in intercepting HTTP & HTTPS traffic is to set the default proxy settings,
  * telling the app that all requests should be sent via our HTTP proxy.
  *
@@ -11,7 +12,8 @@
  * with a framework that does not do this by default (Flutter is notably in this category).
  * To handle those less tidy cases, we manually capture traffic to recognized target ports
  * in the native connect() hook script.
- */
+ *
+ *************************************************************************************************/
 
 Java.perform(() => {
     // Set default JVM system properties for the proxy address. Notably these are used
diff --git a/android/android-system-certificate-injection.js b/android/android-system-certificate-injection.js
index c86801f..4b9897c 100644
--- a/android/android-system-certificate-injection.js
+++ b/android/android-system-certificate-injection.js
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
-/**
+/**************************************************************************************************
+ *
  * Once we have captured traffic (once it's being sent to our proxy port) the next step is
  * to ensure any clients using TLS (HTTPS) trust our CA certificate, to allow us to intercept
  * encrypted connections successfully.
@@ -11,7 +12,8 @@
  * This does not handle all standalone certificate pinning techniques - where the application
  * actively rejects certificates that are trusted by default on the system. That's dealt with
  * in the separate certificate unpinning script.
- */
+ *
+ *************************************************************************************************/
 
 Java.perform(() => {
     // First, we build a JVM representation of our certificate:
diff --git a/config.js b/config.js
index 71831dd..a91c09b 100644
--- a/config.js
+++ b/config.js
@@ -1,3 +1,11 @@
+/******************************************************************************
+ *
+ * This file defines various config parameters, used later within the other
+ * scripts. In all cases, you'll want to set CERT_PEM and likely
+ * PROXY_HOST and PROXY_PORT.
+ *
+ *****************************************************************************/
+
 // Local testing certificate for now
 const CERT_PEM = `-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
 MIIDTzCCAjegAwIBAgIRClDpdJeylUmDvNyq5qq+plcwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAw