2025-06-09 18:12:49 +02:00
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import json
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import logging
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import re
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from enum import Enum
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from json.encoder import encode_basestring_ascii
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from typing import Union, Dict, List, Optional
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from pathlib import Path
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from zlib import crc32
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from cryptography.hazmat.backends import default_backend
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from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization
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from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.padding import OAEP, MGF1
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from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.rsa import RSAPrivateKey
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from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers import Cipher
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from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers.algorithms import AES
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from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers.modes import CBC
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from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.hashes import SHA1
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from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.padding import PKCS7
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from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.serialization import pkcs7
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from cryptography.x509 import Certificate
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from asn1crypto.core import Integer
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from keydive.drm import OEM_CRYPTO_API, KEYBOX_MAX_CLEAR_API
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from keydive.drm.device import Device, DeviceTypes
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from keydive.drm.keybox import KeyBox
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from keydive.utils import dumps, b64enc, b64dec, unidec
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from keydive.drm.protocol.license_pb2 import (
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LicenseRequest, SignedMessage, ProvisioningResponse, SignedProvisioningMessage, ClientIdentification,
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EncryptedClientIdentification, DrmCertificate, SignedDrmCertificate
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)
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kWidevineSystemIdExtensionOid = '1.3.6.1.4.1.11129.4.1.1'
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class OEMCrypto_ProvisioningMethod(Enum):
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"""
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Enum representing different OEMCrypto provisioning methods.
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"""
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ProvisioningError = 0 # Device cannot be provisioned.
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DrmCertificate = 1 # Device has baked-in DRM certificate (level 3 only).
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Keybox = 2 # Device has factory-installed unique keybox.
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OEMCertificate = 3 # Device has factory-installed OEM certificate.
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def CryptoSession_ExtractSystemIdFromOemCert(cert: Certificate) -> int:
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"""
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Extracts the Widevine System ID from an OEM X.509 certificate.
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The System ID is expected to be embedded as a custom extension within the certificate,
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identified by the `kWidevineSystemIdExtensionOid`. The extension contains an ASN.1-encoded
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integer, which this function decodes and returns.
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Args:
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cert (Certificate): An X.509 certificate expected to include the Widevine System ID
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as a custom extension.
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Returns:
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int: The decoded Widevine System ID.
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Raises:
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ValueError: If the certificate does not contain the Widevine System ID extension.
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"""
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# Iterate through all extensions in the certificate to locate the custom Widevine System ID
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for ext in cert.extensions:
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# Match against the known OID for the Widevine System ID
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if ext.oid.dotted_string == kWidevineSystemIdExtensionOid:
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# The extension value contains a DER-encoded ASN.1 INTEGER
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# Decode it using asn1crypto's Integer class and return its integer representation
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return int(Integer.load(ext.value.value))
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# If no matching extension was found, raise a meaningful error
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raise ValueError('The certificate does not contain a Widevine System ID extension.')
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2025-06-14 11:46:05 +02:00
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def CryptoSession_GetSecurityLevel(data: Union[Certificate, str]) -> int:
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2025-06-09 18:12:49 +02:00
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"""
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2025-06-14 11:46:05 +02:00
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Determines the Widevine security level (L1, L2, L3) from a certificate or a string.
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2025-06-09 18:12:49 +02:00
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2025-06-14 11:46:05 +02:00
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The security level is inferred by looking for specific substrings in either:
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- The subject of an X.509 certificate (e.g., containing "_L1_")
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- A plain string (e.g., containing "Level1")
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2025-06-09 18:12:49 +02:00
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Args:
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2025-06-14 11:46:05 +02:00
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data (Union[Certificate, str]): An X.509 certificate or a descriptive string.
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Returns:
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2025-06-14 11:46:05 +02:00
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int: Security level as an integer (1 = L1, 2 = L2, 3 = L3).
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Defaults to level 3 if no recognizable pattern is found.
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2025-06-09 18:12:49 +02:00
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"""
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2025-06-14 11:46:05 +02:00
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if isinstance(data, Certificate):
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# Extract the certificate's subject string in a standardized format
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data = data.subject.rfc4514_string()
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pattern = '_L{}_'
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else:
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pattern = 'Level{}'
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2025-06-09 18:12:49 +02:00
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2025-06-14 11:46:05 +02:00
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# Scan for each level from 1 to 3 in the input string using the appropriate pattern
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# If no match is found, assume the default security level is 3 (L3 - software-based)
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return next((l for l in range(1, 4) if pattern.format(l) in data), 3)
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2025-06-09 18:12:49 +02:00
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class Cdm:
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"""
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Content Decryption Module (CDM) helper class for managing DRM provisioning
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and cryptographic assets such as keys, certificates, and client identity
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objects used in Widevine provisioning.
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This class supports initialization of internal caches and maps for managing
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OEM-provided certificates, keyboxes, and session-specific cryptographic data.
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"""
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def __init__(self, sdk: int, disabler: bool = True):
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"""
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Initializes the CDM instance with the specified SDK version and optional L1 disabler control.
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Sets up internal caches for keys, certificates, and client identity structures,
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which are typically used during Widevine provisioning workflows.
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Args:
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sdk (int): The Android SDK version (used to determine feature compatibility or restrictions).
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disabler (bool, optional): If True, applies logic related to L1 disabling behavior. Defaults to True.
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"""
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self.logger = logging.getLogger('Cdm')
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self._sdk = sdk
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self._disabler = disabler
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self._device_aes_key: List[bytes] = []
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self._keybox: Dict[bytes, KeyBox] = {} # stable_id -> keybox
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self._client_id: Dict[int, ClientIdentification] = {} # public_key.n -> client_id
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self._certificate: Dict[int, List[Certificate]] = {} # public_key.n -> oem_certificate
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self._private_key: Dict[int, RSAPrivateKey] = {} # public_key.n -> private_key
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# Cached ClientIdentification instance representing the device’s current provisioning context
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# This may be reused across multiple requests to avoid re-parsing
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self._provisioning: Optional[ClientIdentification] = None
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@staticmethod
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def __client_info(client_id: ClientIdentification) -> dict:
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"""
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Converts a ClientIdentification object into a dictionary containing its core information,
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and optionally includes capability details if logging is set to DEBUG level.
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This is useful for structured logging or inspection of client identity during
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the provisioning process.
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Args:
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client_id (ClientIdentification): The client identification object that contains
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basic client info and optional client capability fields.
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Returns:
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dict: A dictionary of client info fields. If logging is set to DEBUG,
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a 'capabilities' key is included with detailed capability values.
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"""
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# Extract base client_info fields and store them in a dictionary
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infos = {e.name: e.value for e in client_id.client_info}
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# Check the global logger level; only include capabilities in DEBUG mode
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level = logging.getLogger().getEffectiveLevel()
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if level != logging.DEBUG:
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return infos # Return only core info if not debugging
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capabilities = {}
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# Iterate over all explicitly set fields in client_capabilities
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for field, value in client_id.client_capabilities.ListFields():
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# Handle fields of enum type
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if field.type == field.TYPE_ENUM:
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if field.label == field.LABEL_REPEATED:
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# Convert each enum value (integer) to its named representation
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value = [field.enum_type.values_by_number[v].name for v in value]
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else:
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# Convert single enum value to its name
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value = field.enum_type.values_by_number[value].name
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# Add the field and its (possibly transformed) value to the capabilities dictionary
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capabilities[field.name] = value
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# Merge basic client info and capabilities into a single dictionary and return
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return {**infos, 'capabilities': capabilities}
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@staticmethod
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def __client_generic(client_id: ClientIdentification) -> ClientIdentification:
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"""
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Produces a simplified version of a ClientIdentification object by removing
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select non-essential fields from the `client_info` list. This is useful
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when generating a generic client profile that omits sensitive or dynamic data,
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such as application-specific metadata.
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Args:
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client_id (ClientIdentification): The original, full client identification
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object containing metadata and capabilities.
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Returns:
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ClientIdentification: A new instance with reduced client_info fields, preserving
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core identity and capabilities but omitting values like app name, origin, and cert hash.
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Notes:
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The fields being removed are typically:
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- 'application_name': Identifies the calling app; often dynamic or sensitive.
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- 'origin': Source domain or app origin; may vary per request or client.
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- 'package_certificate_hash_bytes': May be tied to APK signing identity.
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This function ensures that the returned object retains its structure and utility
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while discarding non-critical identifiers that might affect reproducibility or
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comparability across sessions.
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"""
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# Define the fields that are considered dynamic or non-essential for generic use
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excluded_fields = {'application_name', 'origin', 'package_certificate_hash_bytes'}
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# Create a filtered list excluding the above fields from client_info
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filtered_client_info = [
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info for info in client_id.client_info
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if info.name not in excluded_fields
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]
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# Return a new ClientIdentification object with the cleaned client_info list
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return ClientIdentification(
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type=client_id.type,
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token=client_id.token,
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client_info=filtered_client_info,
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# provider_client_token=client_id.provider_client_token,
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# license_counter=client_id.license_counter,
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client_capabilities=client_id.client_capabilities,
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# vmp_data=client_id.vmp_data,
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# device_credentials=client_id.device_credentials
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)
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def set_challenge(self, data: Union[bytes, List[Path]]) -> None:
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"""
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Parses a Widevine license challenge to extract and register client identification data.
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This method accepts either raw protobuf bytes representing a SignedMessage or a list
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of file paths containing such data. It supports recursive processing of multiple
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challenge files and handles both encrypted and unencrypted client IDs.
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Args:
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data (Union[bytes, List[Path]]):
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- Raw protobuf data as bytes representing a SignedMessage, or
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- A list of Path objects pointing to files containing SignedMessage data.
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"""
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# If input is a list of file paths, process each file individually
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if isinstance(data, list):
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for path in data:
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try:
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# Read file content as bytes and recursively process it
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self.set_challenge(data=path.read_bytes())
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except Exception as e:
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self.logger.error('Could not load challenge from file %s: %s', path, e)
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# Proceed only if data is raw bytes after potential recursive calls
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if not isinstance(data, bytes):
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return
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# https://integration.widevine.com/diagnostics
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try:
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# Parse the SignedMessage protobuf from raw data
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signed_message = SignedMessage()
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signed_message.ParseFromString(data)
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# Extract and parse the embedded LicenseRequest message
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license_request = LicenseRequest()
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license_request.ParseFromString(signed_message.msg)
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# Attempt to extract the encrypted client ID (if present)
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encrypted_client_id: EncryptedClientIdentification = license_request.encrypted_client_id
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if encrypted_client_id.SerializeToString():
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# Encrypted client ID found - log its details for debugging
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"""
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self.logger.info(
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'Received encrypted client ID: \n\n%s\n',
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dumps({
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f.name: v for f, v in encrypted_client_id.ListFields()
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}, beauty=True)
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|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
|
|
self.logger.warning('The client ID in this challenge is encrypted and cannot be processed directly.')
|
|
|
|
|
|
else:
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Unencrypted client ID is available - register it immediately
|
|
|
|
|
|
self.set_client_id(data=license_request.client_id)
|
|
|
|
|
|
except Exception as e:
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Log any parsing errors at debug level to avoid cluttering standard logs
|
|
|
|
|
|
self.logger.debug('Unable to register challenge data: %s', e)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def set_client_id(self, data: Union[ClientIdentification, bytes]) -> None:
|
|
|
|
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
|
|
Loads and registers a client ID from either a parsed ClientIdentification object
|
|
|
|
|
|
or raw protobuf bytes. Handles different client ID token types, such as DRM device
|
|
|
|
|
|
certificates, keyboxes, and OEM device certificates.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Args:
|
|
|
|
|
|
data (Union[ClientIdentification, bytes]):
|
|
|
|
|
|
Either a ClientIdentification protobuf object or raw protobuf bytes representing it.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Raises:
|
|
|
|
|
|
ValueError: If the client type is unsupported or certificate chain length is invalid.
|
|
|
|
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
|
|
|
|
# If already a parsed ClientIdentification object, use it directly
|
|
|
|
|
|
if isinstance(data, ClientIdentification):
|
|
|
|
|
|
client_id = data
|
|
|
|
|
|
else:
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Otherwise, parse the protobuf bytes into a ClientIdentification object
|
|
|
|
|
|
client_id = ClientIdentification()
|
|
|
|
|
|
client_id.ParseFromString(data)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Cache this client ID for provisioning context usage elsewhere
|
|
|
|
|
|
self._provisioning = client_id
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Process based on the token type of the client ID
|
|
|
|
|
|
if client_id.type == ClientIdentification.TokenType.DRM_DEVICE_CERTIFICATE:
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Clean unnecessary fields to simplify the client representation
|
|
|
|
|
|
client_id = self.__client_generic(client_id)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Initialize protobuf objects to parse DRM certificates
|
|
|
|
|
|
signed_drm_certificate = SignedDrmCertificate()
|
|
|
|
|
|
drm_certificate = DrmCertificate()
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Parse signed DRM certificate from client token
|
|
|
|
|
|
signed_drm_certificate.ParseFromString(client_id.token)
|
|
|
|
|
|
drm_certificate.ParseFromString(signed_drm_certificate.drm_certificate)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Load the public key from the DRM certificate (DER format)
|
|
|
|
|
|
public_key = serialization.load_der_public_key(
|
|
|
|
|
|
data=drm_certificate.public_key,
|
|
|
|
|
|
backend=default_backend()
|
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Extract the RSA modulus as a unique client identifier
|
|
|
|
|
|
modulus = public_key.public_numbers().n
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Register new or changed client IDs keyed by modulus
|
|
|
|
|
|
if modulus not in self._client_id or self._client_id[modulus] != client_id:
|
|
|
|
|
|
self.logger.info(
|
|
|
|
|
|
'Received client ID: \n\n%s\n',
|
|
|
|
|
|
dumps(self.__client_info(client_id), beauty=True)
|
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
self._client_id[modulus] = client_id
|
|
|
|
|
|
elif client_id.type == ClientIdentification.TokenType.KEYBOX:
|
|
|
|
|
|
# For keybox-based provisioning, register the token as the device ID
|
|
|
|
|
|
self.set_device_id(client_id.token)
|
|
|
|
|
|
elif client_id.type == ClientIdentification.TokenType.OEM_DEVICE_CERTIFICATE:
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Load the certificate chain from DER-encoded PKCS7 token
|
|
|
|
|
|
certs = pkcs7.load_der_pkcs7_certificates(data=client_id.token)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Validate the certificate chain length (expect exactly two certs)
|
|
|
|
|
|
if len(certs) != 2:
|
|
|
|
|
|
raise ValueError(f'Invalid certificate chain length: expected 2, got {len(certs)}')
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Extract RSA modulus from the intermediate certificate's public key
|
|
|
|
|
|
modulus = certs[1].public_key().public_numbers().n
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Register new or updated OEM certificates keyed by modulus
|
|
|
|
|
|
if modulus not in self._certificate:
|
|
|
|
|
|
# openssl asn1parse -inform der -in oem_certificate.der
|
|
|
|
|
|
# openssl pkcs7 -inform der -in oem_certificate.der -print_certs -out output.pem
|
|
|
|
|
|
self.logger.info(
|
|
|
|
|
|
'Received OEM certificate: \n\n%s\n',
|
|
|
|
|
|
dumps([{
|
|
|
|
|
|
'subject': c.subject.rfc4514_string(),
|
|
|
|
|
|
'issuer': c.subject.rfc4514_string(),
|
|
|
|
|
|
'serial_number': c.serial_number,
|
|
|
|
|
|
'valid_from': c.not_valid_before_utc,
|
|
|
|
|
|
'valid_until': c.not_valid_after_utc
|
|
|
|
|
|
} for c in certs], beauty=True)
|
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
self._certificate[modulus] = certs
|
|
|
|
|
|
else:
|
|
|
|
|
|
raise ValueError(f'Unsupported client type: {client_id.type}')
|
|
|
|
|
|
except Exception as e:
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Log exceptions at debug level to keep regular logs clean
|
|
|
|
|
|
self.logger.debug('Unable to register client ID: %s', e)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def set_private_key(self, data: Union[bytes, List[Path]], name: Optional[str] = None) -> None:
|
|
|
|
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
|
|
Registers an OEM private RSA key used for Widevine decryption.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Supports loading from raw PEM/DER bytes or multiple files containing keys.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Args:
|
|
|
|
|
|
data (Union[bytes, List[Path]]):
|
|
|
|
|
|
Raw private key bytes in PEM or DER format, or a list of file paths to key files.
|
|
|
|
|
|
name (Optional[str]):
|
|
|
|
|
|
Optional identifier for the function or implementation related to this key.
|
|
|
|
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
|
|
# If input is a list of file paths, process each file recursively
|
|
|
|
|
|
if isinstance(data, list):
|
|
|
|
|
|
for path in data:
|
|
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Read the file's bytes and call this method again with raw bytes
|
|
|
|
|
|
self.set_private_key(data=path.read_bytes(), name=None)
|
|
|
|
|
|
except Exception as e:
|
|
|
|
|
|
self.logger.error('Could not load RSA key from file %s: %s', path, e)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# If the input is not bytes at this point, do nothing (invalid input)
|
|
|
|
|
|
if not isinstance(data, bytes):
|
|
|
|
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Attempt to load the private key assuming PEM (Base64 encoded) format first
|
|
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
|
|
|
|
private_key = serialization.load_pem_private_key(
|
|
|
|
|
|
data=data,
|
|
|
|
|
|
password=None,
|
|
|
|
|
|
backend=default_backend()
|
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
except ValueError:
|
|
|
|
|
|
# If PEM loading fails, try DER (binary) format instead
|
|
|
|
|
|
private_key = serialization.load_der_private_key(
|
|
|
|
|
|
data=data,
|
|
|
|
|
|
password=None,
|
|
|
|
|
|
backend=default_backend()
|
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Extract the RSA modulus (n) from the public key for unique identification
|
|
|
|
|
|
modulus = private_key.public_key().public_numbers().n
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Only register the key if this modulus is not already present
|
|
|
|
|
|
if modulus not in self._private_key:
|
|
|
|
|
|
self.logger.info(
|
|
|
|
|
|
'Received RSA private key: \n\n%s\n',
|
|
|
|
|
|
private_key.private_bytes(
|
|
|
|
|
|
encoding=serialization.Encoding.PEM,
|
|
|
|
|
|
format=serialization.PrivateFormat.TraditionalOpenSSL,
|
|
|
|
|
|
encryption_algorithm=serialization.NoEncryption()
|
|
|
|
|
|
).decode('utf-8'))
|
|
|
|
|
|
self._private_key[modulus] = private_key
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# If a name is provided but unrecognized, log a warning for developer attention
|
|
|
|
|
|
if name and name not in OEM_CRYPTO_API:
|
|
|
|
|
|
self.logger.warning(
|
|
|
|
|
|
'Unrecognized function name "%s". Please notify the developers to improve this tool.',
|
|
|
|
|
|
name
|
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
except Exception as e:
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Log loading failures at debug level to avoid cluttering normal logs
|
|
|
|
|
|
self.logger.debug('Unable to register RSA private key: %s', e)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def set_keybox(self, data: bytes) -> None:
|
|
|
|
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
|
|
Parses and registers a KeyBox structure used for device provisioning.
|
|
|
|
|
|
The KeyBox contains cryptographic and device-specific data necessary for DRM.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Args:
|
|
|
|
|
|
data (bytes): Raw binary data containing the serialized KeyBox protobuf.
|
|
|
|
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Initialize a new KeyBox instance and parse the protobuf data from bytes
|
|
|
|
|
|
keybox = KeyBox()
|
|
|
|
|
|
keybox.ParseFromString(data) # Parse the raw data into the KeyBox object
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Check if the stable_id is either not present in the dictionary,
|
|
|
|
|
|
# or if the existing KeyBox with this stable_id does not have a device_id set.
|
|
|
|
|
|
if keybox.stable_id not in self._keybox or not self._keybox[keybox.stable_id].device_id:
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Extract keybox metadata info for logging
|
|
|
|
|
|
infos = keybox.keybox_info
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Determine label based on presence of system_id in the keybox info
|
|
|
|
|
|
label = 'keybox' if infos.get('system_id') else 'encrypted keybox'
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
self.logger.info(
|
|
|
|
|
|
'Received %s: \n\n%s\n',
|
|
|
|
|
|
label, dumps(infos, beauty=True)
|
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Store or update the internal keybox dictionary using stable_id as the key
|
|
|
|
|
|
self._keybox[keybox.stable_id] = keybox
|
|
|
|
|
|
except Exception as e:
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Log failure details at debug level to avoid noise in normal logs
|
|
|
|
|
|
self.logger.debug('Unable to register KeyBox data: %s', e)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def set_stable_id(self, data: bytes) -> None:
|
|
|
|
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
|
|
Registers or updates the stable ID for a KeyBox instance.
|
|
|
|
|
|
The stable ID uniquely identifies a device and acts as the key
|
|
|
|
|
|
in the internal KeyBox dictionary.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Args:
|
|
|
|
|
|
data (bytes): Stable device identifier as raw bytes,
|
|
|
|
|
|
used as the unique key to identify the keybox.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Notes:
|
|
|
|
|
|
- If a KeyBox already exists with an empty stable_id, it will be reused;
|
|
|
|
|
|
otherwise, a new KeyBox instance is created.
|
|
|
|
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Only proceed if this stable ID is not already present in the keybox dictionary
|
|
|
|
|
|
if data not in self._keybox:
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Retrieve existing KeyBox with empty stable_id or create a new instance
|
|
|
|
|
|
keybox = self._keybox.get(b'', KeyBox())
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Assign the provided stable ID to this KeyBox instance
|
|
|
|
|
|
keybox.stable_id = data
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Log the stable ID in a human-readable ASCII-safe format
|
|
|
|
|
|
self.logger.info(
|
|
|
|
|
|
'Received stable ID: \n\n%s\n',
|
|
|
|
|
|
encode_basestring_ascii(keybox.stable_id.decode('utf-8')))
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Store or update the KeyBox in the dictionary with stable_id as the key
|
|
|
|
|
|
self._keybox[keybox.stable_id] = keybox
|
|
|
|
|
|
except Exception as e:
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Log exception details at debug level without interrupting flow
|
|
|
|
|
|
self.logger.debug('Unable to register KeyBox stable ID: %s', e)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def set_device_id(self, data: bytes) -> None:
|
|
|
|
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
|
|
Registers or updates the device ID within a KeyBox instance.
|
|
|
|
|
|
The device ID is used to uniquely identify a device for cryptographic
|
|
|
|
|
|
provisioning and licensing purposes.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Args:
|
|
|
|
|
|
data (bytes): Raw device identifier bytes, used to associate a device ID
|
|
|
|
|
|
with a KeyBox object.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Notes:
|
|
|
|
|
|
- If the device ID is already associated with a KeyBox, this method does nothing.
|
|
|
|
|
|
- If a KeyBox without a device ID exists, it will be reused; otherwise,
|
|
|
|
|
|
a new KeyBox instance will be created.
|
|
|
|
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Check if this device ID is already registered in any existing KeyBox
|
|
|
|
|
|
if not any(k for k in self._keybox.values() if k.device_id == data):
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Find a KeyBox without a device ID to reuse, or create a new KeyBox
|
|
|
|
|
|
keybox = next((k for k in self._keybox.values() if not k.device_id), KeyBox())
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Assign the provided device ID to the KeyBox
|
|
|
|
|
|
keybox.device_id = data
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Retrieve device-related metadata for logging purposes
|
|
|
|
|
|
infos = keybox.device_info
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Choose label based on whether a system_id is present in metadata
|
|
|
|
|
|
label = 'device ID' if infos.get('system_id') else 'encrypted device ID'
|
|
|
|
|
|
self.logger.info(
|
|
|
|
|
|
'Received %s: \n\n%s\n',
|
|
|
|
|
|
label, dumps(infos, beauty=True) if infos else b64enc(keybox.device_id))
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Store or update the KeyBox in the dictionary using its stable_id as the key
|
|
|
|
|
|
self._keybox[keybox.stable_id] = keybox
|
|
|
|
|
|
except Exception as e:
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Log exceptions with context at debug level without raising
|
|
|
|
|
|
self.logger.debug('Unable to register KeyBox device ID: %s', e)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def set_device_aes_key(self, data: Union[bytes, List[str]]) -> None:
|
|
|
|
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
|
|
Imports and stores AES device keys used for decrypting protected content.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This method accepts either a single AES key as raw bytes or a list of strings
|
|
|
|
|
|
representing AES keys in various formats, including:
|
|
|
|
|
|
- Hexadecimal strings
|
|
|
|
|
|
- Base64-encoded strings (standard or URL-safe)
|
|
|
|
|
|
- File paths pointing to binary key files
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Args:
|
|
|
|
|
|
data (bytes or List[str]): The AES key(s) to import. Either a single
|
|
|
|
|
|
16-byte AES key (bytes) or a list of strings
|
|
|
|
|
|
representing keys in different encoded forms or file paths.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Notes:
|
|
|
|
|
|
- Only keys exactly 16 bytes in length are accepted as valid AES keys.
|
|
|
|
|
|
- If a list of strings is given, the method tries each parser (hex, base64, file)
|
|
|
|
|
|
until one succeeds for each entry.
|
|
|
|
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
|
|
if isinstance(data, list):
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Iterate over all string inputs, attempt parsing with multiple strategies
|
|
|
|
|
|
for value in data:
|
|
|
|
|
|
for parser in (bytes.fromhex, b64dec, lambda v: Path(v).read_bytes()):
|
|
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Recursively call with successfully decoded raw bytes
|
|
|
|
|
|
self.set_device_aes_key(parser(value))
|
|
|
|
|
|
break # Exit parser loop once successful
|
|
|
|
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Ignore failures and try next parser
|
|
|
|
|
|
pass
|
|
|
|
|
|
else:
|
|
|
|
|
|
# If no parser succeeded, log the failure with the raw input value
|
|
|
|
|
|
self.logger.error('Could not import AES key from input: %s', value)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# From here on, ensure input is raw bytes representing the AES key
|
|
|
|
|
|
if not isinstance(data, bytes):
|
|
|
|
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Confirm the AES key length matches 16 bytes (AES-128 standard)
|
|
|
|
|
|
assert len(data) == 16, f'Invalid AES key length: expected 16 bytes, got {len(data)}'
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Store the valid AES key into internal cache for later use
|
|
|
|
|
|
self._device_aes_key.append(data)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Log success message with the hex-encoded key for clarity
|
|
|
|
|
|
self.logger.info('Received device AES key: %s', data.hex())
|
|
|
|
|
|
except Exception as e:
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Log any exceptions encountered during key validation or storage
|
|
|
|
|
|
self.logger.debug('Unable to register device AES key: %s', e)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def set_provisioning_method(self, data: bytes) -> None:
|
|
|
|
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
|
|
Determines and logs the provisioning method used by the Content Decryption Module (CDM).
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This method decodes the given byte data to an integer, which maps to an
|
|
|
|
|
|
OEMCrypto_ProvisioningMethod enumeration value. It helps identify the provisioning
|
|
|
|
|
|
mechanism in use and logs relevant diagnostic information, especially when L1
|
|
|
|
|
|
provisioning appears to be disabled improperly.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Args:
|
|
|
|
|
|
data (bytes): UTF-8 encoded string representing an integer corresponding to
|
|
|
|
|
|
an OEMCrypto_ProvisioningMethod enum value.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Exception:
|
|
|
|
|
|
Catches and logs all exceptions encountered during decoding or enum conversion.
|
|
|
|
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Decode bytes to UTF-8 string, convert to int, and map to provisioning method enum
|
|
|
|
|
|
method = OEMCrypto_ProvisioningMethod(int(data.decode('utf-8')))
|
|
|
|
|
|
if method == OEMCrypto_ProvisioningMethod.Keybox and self._disabler:
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Warn user if L1 provisioning is enabled but disabling procedure incomplete
|
|
|
|
|
|
self.logger.warning(
|
|
|
|
|
|
'L1 provisioning deactivation appears incomplete. '
|
|
|
|
|
|
'Consider using a web dump or forcibly terminating the process to ensure proper disabling.'
|
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
else:
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Log the provisioning method name for informational purposes
|
|
|
|
|
|
self.logger.debug('Receive provisioning method: %s', method.name)
|
|
|
|
|
|
except Exception as e:
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Log any errors during decoding or mapping to enum with debug severity
|
|
|
|
|
|
self.logger.debug('Unable to parse provisioning method: %s', e)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def set_provisioning_response(self, data: bytes) -> None:
|
|
|
|
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
|
|
Parses and applies a provisioning response from the Google Widevine provisioning service.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Supports both Keybox-based provisioning and Provisioning 3.0 OTA PKI formats.
|
|
|
|
|
|
This method extracts and decrypts the device RSA private key using known AES session keys,
|
|
|
|
|
|
which may be retrieved from keyboxes or OEM provisioning keys. It also supports
|
|
|
|
|
|
setting up the device certificate and updating client identification.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Args:
|
|
|
|
|
|
data (bytes): JSON-encoded provisioning response as received from the provisioning server.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Exception:
|
|
|
|
|
|
Catches and logs all exceptions raised during parsing, decryption, or client ID setup.
|
|
|
|
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Extract and decode the base64-encoded signed provisioning message from the JSON response
|
|
|
|
|
|
b64_signed_data = json.loads(data.split(b'\x00')[0])['signedResponse']
|
|
|
|
|
|
signed_data = b64dec(b64_signed_data, safe=True)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Parse the SignedProvisioningMessage protobuf
|
|
|
|
|
|
signed_response = SignedProvisioningMessage()
|
|
|
|
|
|
signed_response.ParseFromString(signed_data)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Extract the ProvisioningResponse payload embedded in the signed message
|
|
|
|
|
|
provisioning_response = ProvisioningResponse()
|
|
|
|
|
|
provisioning_response.ParseFromString(signed_response.message)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Gather all known AES session keys from stored keyboxes (OEM Keybox keys)
|
|
|
|
|
|
session_enc_keys = [k.device_aes_key for k in self._keybox.values() if k.device_aes_key]
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Optionally, add additional AES keys extracted via reverse engineering/TEE exploit (if any)
|
|
|
|
|
|
session_enc_keys += self._device_aes_key
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if provisioning_response.wrapping_key:
|
|
|
|
|
|
# OTA PKI-Based provisioning (Provisioning 3.0)
|
|
|
|
|
|
self.logger.info(
|
|
|
|
|
|
'Received OTA provisioning response: \n\n%s\n',
|
|
|
|
|
|
dumps({
|
|
|
|
|
|
'signature': {'type': 'RSASSA-PSS', 'data': signed_response.signature},
|
|
|
|
|
|
'nonce': provisioning_response.nonce,
|
|
|
|
|
|
'wrapping_key': provisioning_response.wrapping_key
|
|
|
|
|
|
}, beauty=True)
|
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Attempt to decrypt the AES wrapping key using all stored OEM private RSA keys
|
|
|
|
|
|
for oem_cert_priv_key in self._private_key.values():
|
|
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
|
|
|
|
session_enc_key = oem_cert_priv_key.decrypt(
|
|
|
|
|
|
ciphertext=provisioning_response.wrapping_key,
|
|
|
|
|
|
padding=OAEP(
|
|
|
|
|
|
mgf=MGF1(algorithm=SHA1()),
|
|
|
|
|
|
algorithm=SHA1(),
|
|
|
|
|
|
label=None
|
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
session_enc_keys.append(session_enc_key)
|
|
|
|
|
|
except Exception as e:
|
|
|
|
|
|
self.logger.debug('Unable to decrypt OTA session key: %s', e)
|
|
|
|
|
|
else:
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Keybox-based provisioning (Provisioning 2.0)
|
|
|
|
|
|
self.logger.info(
|
|
|
|
|
|
'Receive Keybox provisioning response: \n\n%s\n',
|
|
|
|
|
|
dumps({
|
|
|
|
|
|
'signature': {'type': 'HMAC-SHA256', 'data': signed_response.signature},
|
|
|
|
|
|
'nonce': provisioning_response.nonce
|
|
|
|
|
|
}, beauty=True)
|
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Attempt to decrypt the device RSA private key using all gathered AES session keys
|
|
|
|
|
|
for session_enc_key in session_enc_keys:
|
|
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
|
|
|
|
# TODO: complete the keybox with the AES key
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Initialize AES-CBC cipher with the session key and provided IV
|
|
|
|
|
|
cipher = Cipher(
|
|
|
|
|
|
algorithm=AES(session_enc_key),
|
|
|
|
|
|
mode=CBC(provisioning_response.device_rsa_key_iv),
|
|
|
|
|
|
backend=default_backend()
|
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
decryptor = cipher.decryptor()
|
|
|
|
|
|
dec_padded_data = decryptor.update(provisioning_response.device_rsa_key) + decryptor.finalize()
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Remove PKCS7 padding to obtain the original private key bytes
|
|
|
|
|
|
unpadder = PKCS7(AES.block_size).unpadder()
|
|
|
|
|
|
dec_data = unpadder.update(dec_padded_data) + unpadder.finalize()
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Register the decrypted RSA private key internally
|
|
|
|
|
|
self.set_private_key(dec_data, None)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Successfully decrypted and stored the RSA key, no need to try further keys
|
|
|
|
|
|
# break
|
|
|
|
|
|
except Exception as e:
|
|
|
|
|
|
# If no decryption succeeded, OEM private key remains unset
|
|
|
|
|
|
# At this point, OTA provisioning using Provisioning 3.0 (PKI-based) might apply
|
|
|
|
|
|
# But this flow assumes Provisioning 2.0 (Keybox-based), so no further action here
|
|
|
|
|
|
self.logger.debug('Failed to decrypt RSA private key using AES key: %s', session_enc_key.hex())
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# If a provisioning context exists, update the ClientIdentification with new capabilities and certificates
|
|
|
|
|
|
if self._provisioning:
|
|
|
|
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
|
|
client_capabilities {
|
|
|
|
|
|
client_token: true
|
|
|
|
|
|
session_token: true
|
|
|
|
|
|
max_hdcp_version: HDCP_V2_2
|
|
|
|
|
|
oem_crypto_api_version: 15
|
|
|
|
|
|
anti_rollback_usage_table: false
|
|
|
|
|
|
srm_version: 0
|
|
|
|
|
|
can_update_srm: false
|
|
|
|
|
|
supported_certificate_key_type: RSA_2048
|
|
|
|
|
|
analog_output_capabilities: ANALOG_OUTPUT_NONE
|
|
|
|
|
|
can_disable_analog_output: false
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Update client capabilities with typical fields
|
|
|
|
|
|
client_capabilities = self._provisioning.client_capabilities
|
|
|
|
|
|
client_capabilities.session_token = True
|
|
|
|
|
|
client_capabilities.max_hdcp_version = ClientIdentification.ClientCapabilities.HdcpVersion.HDCP_NONE
|
|
|
|
|
|
client_capabilities.anti_rollback_usage_table = False
|
|
|
|
|
|
client_capabilities.can_update_srm = False
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Construct a new ClientIdentification token with the provisioned device certificate
|
|
|
|
|
|
client_id = ClientIdentification(
|
|
|
|
|
|
type=ClientIdentification.TokenType.DRM_DEVICE_CERTIFICATE,
|
|
|
|
|
|
token=provisioning_response.device_certificate,
|
|
|
|
|
|
client_info=self._provisioning.client_info,
|
|
|
|
|
|
provider_client_token=self._provisioning.provider_client_token,
|
|
|
|
|
|
license_counter=self._provisioning.license_counter,
|
|
|
|
|
|
client_capabilities=client_capabilities,
|
|
|
|
|
|
vmp_data=self._provisioning.vmp_data,
|
|
|
|
|
|
device_credentials=self._provisioning.device_credentials
|
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Register the updated client identification token
|
|
|
|
|
|
self.set_client_id(client_id)
|
|
|
|
|
|
except Exception as e:
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Log any unexpected error encountered during the provisioning response handling
|
|
|
|
|
|
self.logger.debug('Unable to process provisioning response: %s', e)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def __resolve(self) -> Dict[int, dict]:
|
|
|
|
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
|
|
Consolidates and organizes device-related information into a structured dictionary.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This method collects client IDs, private keys, OEM certificates, and keyboxes,
|
|
|
|
|
|
grouping them by their system ID. It builds a comprehensive mapping containing:
|
|
|
|
|
|
- The file system path derived from client info (company and model names),
|
|
|
|
|
|
- The security level of the device (defaulting to level 3 if unknown),
|
|
|
|
|
|
- Lists of associated device keys,
|
|
|
|
|
|
- Linked keybox identifiers,
|
|
|
|
|
|
- Certificates associated with each system ID.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The collected information is primarily used for managing device security contexts
|
|
|
|
|
|
such as DRM key provisioning and secure storage.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Returns:
|
|
|
|
|
|
dict[int, dict]: Mapping of system IDs to dictionaries with device information.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Notes:
|
|
|
|
|
|
- If no client info is available, the returned dictionary may be empty.
|
|
|
|
|
|
- Items are updated in multiple passes: first by client ID, then by certificates, and finally by keyboxes.
|
|
|
|
|
|
- Handles missing or incomplete data gracefully by skipping problematic entries.
|
|
|
|
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
|
|
items = {}
|
|
|
|
|
|
path = None # Will hold the base path for device records derived from client info
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Process all client IDs and their associated private keys
|
|
|
|
|
|
for key, client_id in self._client_id.items():
|
2025-06-14 11:46:05 +02:00
|
|
|
|
client_info = self.__client_info(client_id)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2025-06-09 18:12:49 +02:00
|
|
|
|
# Parse DRM certificate from the client token protobuf data
|
|
|
|
|
|
signed_drm_certificate = SignedDrmCertificate()
|
|
|
|
|
|
signed_drm_certificate.ParseFromString(client_id.token)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
drm_certificate = DrmCertificate()
|
|
|
|
|
|
drm_certificate.ParseFromString(signed_drm_certificate.drm_certificate)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2025-06-14 11:46:05 +02:00
|
|
|
|
# Extract system ID and security level from client ID
|
2025-06-09 18:12:49 +02:00
|
|
|
|
system_id = drm_certificate.system_id
|
2025-06-14 11:46:05 +02:00
|
|
|
|
level = CryptoSession_GetSecurityLevel(client_info['oem_crypto_build_information'])
|
2025-06-09 18:12:49 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Derive a filesystem path from client info on the first iteration
|
|
|
|
|
|
if not path:
|
|
|
|
|
|
path = Path() / unidec(client_info['company_name']) / unidec(client_info['model_name'])
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Attempt to find the private key matching the current client key
|
|
|
|
|
|
private_key = next((v for k, v in self._private_key.items() if k == key), None)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Initialize or retrieve existing record for this system ID
|
|
|
|
|
|
item = items.get(system_id, {
|
|
|
|
|
|
'path': path,
|
2025-06-14 11:46:05 +02:00
|
|
|
|
'level': level, # Default security level
|
2025-06-09 18:12:49 +02:00
|
|
|
|
'device': [], # List of device keys associated
|
|
|
|
|
|
'keybox': None, # Associated keybox ID
|
|
|
|
|
|
'certificate': None # Associated certificate ID
|
|
|
|
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Add the client key to the device list if private key exists and not already added
|
|
|
|
|
|
if private_key and key not in item['device']:
|
|
|
|
|
|
item['device'].append(key)
|
|
|
|
|
|
items[system_id] = item
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# If no path was established from client IDs, return early with what we have
|
|
|
|
|
|
if not path:
|
|
|
|
|
|
return items
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Add OEM device certificates to the records
|
|
|
|
|
|
for key, certs in self._certificate.items():
|
|
|
|
|
|
intermediate_cert = certs[1] # Typically the intermediate cert in chain
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Extract system ID and security level from certificate
|
|
|
|
|
|
system_id = CryptoSession_ExtractSystemIdFromOemCert(intermediate_cert)
|
2025-06-14 11:46:05 +02:00
|
|
|
|
level = CryptoSession_GetSecurityLevel(intermediate_cert)
|
2025-06-09 18:12:49 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Find matching private key for this certificate key
|
|
|
|
|
|
private_key = next((v for k, v in self._private_key.items() if k == key), None)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Initialize or retrieve record for this system ID
|
|
|
|
|
|
item = items.get(system_id, {
|
|
|
|
|
|
'path': path,
|
|
|
|
|
|
'level': 3,
|
|
|
|
|
|
'device': [],
|
|
|
|
|
|
'keybox': None,
|
|
|
|
|
|
'certificate': None
|
|
|
|
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
|
|
item['level'] = level
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Assign the certificate key if private key exists and certificate is not already set
|
|
|
|
|
|
if private_key and item['certificate'] != key:
|
|
|
|
|
|
item['certificate'] = key
|
|
|
|
|
|
items[system_id] = item
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Add keybox entries to the records
|
|
|
|
|
|
for key, keybox in self._keybox.items():
|
|
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Verify keybox completeness by serializing (throws if invalid)
|
|
|
|
|
|
keybox.SerializeToString()
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Extract system ID from keybox info, if available
|
|
|
|
|
|
keybox_info = keybox.keybox_info
|
|
|
|
|
|
system_id = keybox_info.get('system_id')
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if system_id:
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Determine security level based on SDK version and keybox state
|
|
|
|
|
|
level = 1 if self._sdk > KEYBOX_MAX_CLEAR_API else 3
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Initialize or retrieve record for this system ID
|
|
|
|
|
|
item = items.get(system_id, {
|
|
|
|
|
|
'path': path,
|
|
|
|
|
|
'level': level,
|
|
|
|
|
|
'device': [],
|
|
|
|
|
|
'keybox': None,
|
|
|
|
|
|
'certificate': None
|
|
|
|
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
|
|
else:
|
|
|
|
|
|
# If system ID is missing, pick the first level 3 record as fallback
|
|
|
|
|
|
system_id, item = next((k, v) for k, v in items.items() if v['level'] == 3)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Link the keybox to the record if not already assigned
|
|
|
|
|
|
if item['keybox'] != key:
|
|
|
|
|
|
item['keybox'] = key
|
|
|
|
|
|
items[system_id] = item
|
|
|
|
|
|
except (AssertionError, StopIteration):
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Skip incomplete or invalid keybox entries silently
|
|
|
|
|
|
pass
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return items
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def export(self, wvd: bool = False, keybox: bool = False) -> Dict[Path, bytes]:
|
|
|
|
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
|
|
Export device credentials and optionally serialize them into .wvd and keybox formats.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This function collects all device-related data such as client IDs, private keys,
|
|
|
|
|
|
OEM certificates, and keyboxes, then prepares them for export by organizing
|
|
|
|
|
|
them into files mapped by file system paths.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Args:
|
|
|
|
|
|
wvd (bool): If True, export device credentials in the pywidevine .wvd format,
|
|
|
|
|
|
enabling compatibility with the pywidevine toolset.
|
|
|
|
|
|
keybox (bool): If True, include OEM certificates and keybox binary data in the export.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Returns:
|
|
|
|
|
|
dict[Path, bytes]: A dictionary mapping file paths (as Path objects) to their corresponding
|
|
|
|
|
|
binary content (as bytes), ready to be written to disk.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Notes:
|
|
|
|
|
|
- File paths are constructed hierarchically based on company name, model name, system ID, and modulus.
|
|
|
|
|
|
- The WVD file names include company/model information and a CRC32 hash for uniqueness.
|
|
|
|
|
|
- OEM certificates and keyboxes are included only if `keybox` is set to True.
|
|
|
|
|
|
- Private keys are serialized in PEM format without encryption for direct use.
|
|
|
|
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
|
|
files = {}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Retrieve organized records containing device and certificate info
|
|
|
|
|
|
records = self.__resolve()
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Iterate through each device record grouped by system ID
|
|
|
|
|
|
for system_id, record in records.items():
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Base directory for this system ID
|
|
|
|
|
|
parent = record['path'] / str(system_id)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Export client IDs and their private keys
|
|
|
|
|
|
for modulus in record['device']:
|
|
|
|
|
|
path = parent / str(modulus)[:10]
|
|
|
|
|
|
client_id = self._client_id[modulus]
|
|
|
|
|
|
private_key = self._private_key[modulus]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Serialize the client ID protobuf to bytes
|
|
|
|
|
|
client_id_serialized = client_id.SerializeToString()
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Serialize the private key to PEM format without encryption
|
|
|
|
|
|
private_key_pem = private_key.private_bytes(
|
|
|
|
|
|
encoding=serialization.Encoding.PEM,
|
|
|
|
|
|
format=serialization.PrivateFormat.TraditionalOpenSSL,
|
|
|
|
|
|
encryption_algorithm=serialization.NoEncryption()
|
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Save raw client ID and private key files
|
|
|
|
|
|
files[path / 'client_id.bin'] = client_id_serialized
|
|
|
|
|
|
files[path / 'private_key.pem'] = private_key_pem
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if wvd:
|
|
|
|
|
|
# https://github.com/devine-dl/pywidevine/blob/master/pywidevine/main.py#L211
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Build pywidevine Device object for WVD serialization
|
|
|
|
|
|
device = Device(
|
|
|
|
|
|
type_=DeviceTypes.ANDROID,
|
|
|
|
|
|
security_level=record['level'],
|
|
|
|
|
|
flags=None,
|
|
|
|
|
|
private_key=private_key,
|
|
|
|
|
|
client_id=client_id
|
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Serialize the device to pywidevine-compatible WVD format
|
|
|
|
|
|
device_serialized = device.dumps()
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Create a descriptive and unique filename based on device info and a CRC32 hash
|
|
|
|
|
|
client_info = self.__client_info(client_id)
|
|
|
|
|
|
name = f"{client_info['company_name']} {client_info['model_name']}"
|
|
|
|
|
|
if client_info.get('widevine_cdm_version'):
|
|
|
|
|
|
name += f" {client_info['widevine_cdm_version']}"
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Append CRC32 hash of serialized device for uniqueness
|
|
|
|
|
|
name += f" {crc32(device_serialized).to_bytes(4, 'big').hex()}"
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Normalize name to lowercase with underscores
|
|
|
|
|
|
name = re.sub(r'\s+', '_', unidec(name).lower())
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Store the serialized WVD file with naming convention including system ID and security level
|
|
|
|
|
|
files[path / f'{name}_{system_id}_l{device.security_level}.wvd'] = device_serialized
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Skip keybox and OEM certificate export if flag is False
|
|
|
|
|
|
if not keybox:
|
|
|
|
|
|
continue
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Export keybox binary if available
|
|
|
|
|
|
keybox = self._keybox.get(record['keybox'])
|
|
|
|
|
|
if keybox:
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Choose file suffix based on presence of system_id in keybox info
|
|
|
|
|
|
suffix = 'bin' if keybox.keybox_info.get('system_id') else 'enc'
|
|
|
|
|
|
# files[parent / f"keybox_{system_id}_l{record['level']}.{suffix}"] = keybox.SerializeToString()
|
|
|
|
|
|
files[parent / f'keybox.{suffix}'] = keybox.SerializeToString()
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Export OEM certificate chain in PEM format if available
|
|
|
|
|
|
certificate = self._certificate.get(record['certificate'])
|
|
|
|
|
|
if certificate:
|
|
|
|
|
|
# files[parent / f"oem_certificate_{system_id}_l{record['level']}.pem"] = b''.join([
|
|
|
|
|
|
files[parent / 'oem_certificate.pem'] = b''.join([
|
|
|
|
|
|
c.public_bytes(encoding=serialization.Encoding.PEM)
|
|
|
|
|
|
for c in certificate
|
|
|
|
|
|
])
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Export OEM private key in PEM format
|
|
|
|
|
|
private_key = self._private_key[record['certificate']]
|
|
|
|
|
|
# files[parent / f"oem_private_key_{system_id}_l{record['level']}.pem"] = private_key.private_bytes(
|
|
|
|
|
|
files[parent / 'oem_private_key.pem'] = private_key.private_bytes(
|
|
|
|
|
|
encoding=serialization.Encoding.PEM,
|
|
|
|
|
|
format=serialization.PrivateFormat.TraditionalOpenSSL,
|
|
|
|
|
|
encryption_algorithm=serialization.NoEncryption()
|
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return files
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
__all__ = ('Cdm',)
|