* feat(observability): OpenTelemetry logs+traces with secret redaction Part of #265. Adds opt-in OpenTelemetry (logs + traces) alongside the existing stderr + opslog pipeline, plus secret redaction on all sinks. Default-off: with no OTEL_* / SILO_OTEL_ENABLED config, behavior is unchanged. Bootstrap (internal/telemetry): - Setup() builds one shared resource, a TracerProvider (parent-based trace-id ratio sampler), a LoggerProvider, and the W3C TraceContext+Baggage propagator from env. It installs NO MeterProvider — metrics stay on Prometheus, and the built-in no-op global MeterProvider keeps the trace instrumentation libs from double-emitting. Shutdown is deferred with a flush timeout. - Logs are bridged via otelslog fan-out (slog.MultiHandler), level-gated by the shared LevelVar and best-effort so a failing collector can't break the console or DB branches. stderr + opslog stay untouched. Secret redaction (internal/logredact): - A slog.Handler masks secret-keyed attributes (password, token, api_key, authorization, cookie, ...) — including .With-bound attrs, nested groups, secret-keyed group subtrees, and values behind a LogValuer — on the console and OTLP sinks, with a no-op fast path when a record has no secret keys. opslog.shouldRedact delegates to logredact.SecretKey so all sinks share one marker list. Rotation is infra-managed (no custom file sink): container runtime for stderr, collector/backend for OTLP, opslog partition-pruning for the DB. Documented in docs/architecture/observability.md. Verification: go build ./..., go vet, gofmt -l — clean; go test ./internal/telemetry/ ./internal/logredact/ -race pass. AI-use disclosure: implemented with AI assistance (Claude Code), including adversarial reviews that hardened the bootstrap and fixed two redaction leak paths; reviewed by the author. * refactor(observability): slog context+component sweep, sloglint gate (phase 3) Part of #265. Builds on the OTel bootstrap + redaction commit. Standardizes every log call site onto the context-carrying slog variants so records correlate with the active OpenTelemetry trace, and locks the standard in with a machine gate so future code (human- or AI-authored) can't drift back. - Call-site sweep: converted the remaining slog.<Level>(...) calls to the slog.<Level>Context(ctx, ...) form wherever a context.Context is in scope (background/init calls with no ctx are left as-is), across 183 files. Applied via a type-aware AST codemod. Log levels and message strings are preserved verbatim; a component attr (canonical per-package name) is added to direct package-level slog calls. Bound-logger calls keep their existing .With bindings. The main.go and telemetry package conversions rode with their file in the previous commit to keep each file within a single commit. - Enforcement (.golangci.yml): enable sloglint with context=scope, static-msg, key-naming-case=snake, no-mixed-args. After the sweep all four report zero violations repo-wide (tests included), so make lint / CI now blocks any regression to the non-context form. The gate ships with the sweep because it cannot be green until the legacy sites are converted. Metrics remain on Prometheus; no behavior change to /metrics or Grafana. Verification: go build ./..., go vet ./..., gofmt -l — clean; sloglint (all 4 rules) 0 violations repo-wide; log levels verified unchanged. AI-use disclosure: implemented with AI assistance (Claude Code), including the codemod; reviewed by the author. * fix(observability): honor per-signal OTLP protocol and secret WithGroup names Two Codex review findings on PR #290: - telemetry: OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_{TRACES,LOGS}_PROTOCOL now override the generic OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_PROTOCOL per signal, so mixed collector setups (e.g. HTTP logs + gRPC traces) build the right exporter. - logredact: entering a group whose name is secret-bearing (e.g. WithGroup("authorization")) now masks every leaf in that subtree, matching how slog.Group("authorization", ...) is masked as a whole. * fix(observability): address review feedback on telemetry bootstrap - Telemetry setup failure no longer kills boot: Setup returns usable no-op providers alongside the error and main logs and continues with telemetry disabled, honoring the best-effort contract. - Honor OTEL_TRACES_SAMPLER (always_on/off, traceidratio, parentbased_* variants); unsupported values fall back to parentbased_traceidratio. - Attach node identity as semconv service.instance.id instead of the non-semconv node.name. - Rename opslog retention-scope log attrs to target_component/target_level so they no longer collide with the canonical component routing key, and tag those lines with component=opslog. - Fix stale levelGated comment casing; use WarnContext in the telemetry shutdown defer; document the LogValuer double-resolve on the redaction slow path. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Quick <31828688+Quick104@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
266 lines
9.8 KiB
Go
266 lines
9.8 KiB
Go
package handlers
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import (
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"encoding/json"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"log/slog"
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"net/http"
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"strconv"
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"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
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apimw "github.com/Silo-Server/silo-server/internal/api/middleware"
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"github.com/Silo-Server/silo-server/internal/catalog"
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"github.com/Silo-Server/silo-server/internal/subtitles/ai"
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"github.com/Silo-Server/silo-server/internal/userstore"
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)
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// SubtitleAIHandler exposes on-demand AI subtitle translation backed by the
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// configured OpenAI-compatible engine. Generated tracks are stored as ordinary
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// downloaded subtitles, so they reach every client through the existing
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// subtitle pipeline.
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type SubtitleAIHandler struct {
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service *ai.Service
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FileAuthorizer *MediaFileAuthorizer
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// StoreProvider resolves household profiles for the transcription quota
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// exemption check; when nil the whole admin account is exempt.
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StoreProvider userstore.UserStoreProvider
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}
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// NewSubtitleAIHandler creates a handler backed by the given service.
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func NewSubtitleAIHandler(service *ai.Service) *SubtitleAIHandler {
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return &SubtitleAIHandler{service: service}
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}
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// authorizeMediaFileAccess verifies the caller may access the given media file.
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// Shared by the subtitle handlers so authorization stays in one place.
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func authorizeMediaFileAccess(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, authorizer *MediaFileAuthorizer, fileID int) bool {
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if authorizer == nil {
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writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "internal_error", "Media file authorization is not configured")
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return false
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}
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if _, err := authorizer.Authorize(r, fileID); err != nil {
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switch {
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case errors.Is(err, catalog.ErrItemNotFound), errors.Is(err, catalog.ErrEpisodeNotFound):
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writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "not_found", "Media file not found")
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default:
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writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "internal_error", "Failed to authorize media file")
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}
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return false
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}
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return true
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}
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type translateSubtitleRequest struct {
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MediaFileID int `json:"media_file_id"`
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// Kind selects the job: "translate" (default), "transcribe", or
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// "transcribe_translate". For ASR kinds, source_index is the audio track
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// index (-1 = default track) and target_language is optional for plain
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// transcribe (acts as a language hint).
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Kind string `json:"kind"`
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SourceIndex int `json:"source_index"`
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SourceLanguage string `json:"source_language"`
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TargetLanguage string `json:"target_language"`
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SessionID string `json:"session_id"`
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StartPosition float64 `json:"start_position"`
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}
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// HandleStatus reports whether AI subtitle translation / ASR generation are
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// available, so the player can show or hide the entry points.
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// GET /api/v1/subtitles/ai/status
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func (h *SubtitleAIHandler) HandleStatus(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{
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"enabled": h.service.Enabled(),
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"transcribe_enabled": h.service.TranscribeEnabled(),
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})
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}
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// WriteSubtitleAIDisabledStatus answers the AI status capability probe with a
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// 200 {"enabled": false} when no AI handler is wired, so the client gets a clean
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// negative instead of a 404 (the 2-segment /ai/status path is not shadowed by the
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// 1-segment /{media_file_id} route — they never compete in chi's router).
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func WriteSubtitleAIDisabledStatus(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{"enabled": false, "transcribe_enabled": false})
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}
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// HandleTranslate enqueues a translation job. POST /api/v1/subtitles/ai/translate
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func (h *SubtitleAIHandler) HandleTranslate(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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var req translateSubtitleRequest
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if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
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writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid_request", "Invalid request body")
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return
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}
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if req.MediaFileID <= 0 {
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writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "bad_request", "media_file_id is required")
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return
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}
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kind := ai.JobKind(req.Kind)
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if kind == "" {
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kind = ai.JobKindTranslate
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}
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// A plain transcribe produces a track in the spoken language, so the
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// target is optional; every other kind needs one.
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if req.TargetLanguage == "" && kind != ai.JobKindTranscribe {
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writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "bad_request", "target_language is required")
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return
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}
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if !authorizeMediaFileAccess(w, r, h.FileAuthorizer, req.MediaFileID) {
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return
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}
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var requestedBy *int
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if userID := apimw.GetUserID(r.Context()); userID != 0 {
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requestedBy = &userID
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}
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job, err := h.service.Enqueue(r.Context(), ai.JobRequest{
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MediaFileID: req.MediaFileID,
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Kind: kind,
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SourceIndex: req.SourceIndex,
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SourceLanguage: req.SourceLanguage,
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TargetLanguage: req.TargetLanguage,
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RequestedBy: requestedBy,
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QuotaExempt: h.quotaExempt(r),
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SessionID: req.SessionID,
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StartPosition: req.StartPosition,
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})
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if err != nil {
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switch {
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case errors.Is(err, ai.ErrEngineNotConfigured):
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writeError(w, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, "not_configured",
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"AI subtitle translation is not configured on this server")
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case errors.Is(err, ai.ErrQuotaExceeded):
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writeError(w, http.StatusTooManyRequests, "quota_exceeded", quotaExceededMessage(err))
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case errors.Is(err, ai.ErrInvalidRequest):
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writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "bad_request", err.Error())
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default:
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slog.ErrorContext(r.Context(), "failed to enqueue subtitle translation", "component", "api",
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"media_file_id", req.MediaFileID, "error", err)
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writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "internal_error", "Failed to start translation")
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}
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return
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}
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusAccepted, map[string]any{"job": job})
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}
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// quotaExempt reports whether the caller is exempt from the transcription
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// quota: an admin account acting as itself (no profile context) or through
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// its primary (household parent) profile. Other profiles on an admin account
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// — e.g. a kid's profile — stay subject to the quota even though the account
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// holds the admin role. X-Profile-Id is client-asserted, so this is a
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// budgeting gate, not a security boundary; the quota itself is account-scoped.
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func (h *SubtitleAIHandler) quotaExempt(r *http.Request) bool {
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ctx := r.Context()
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if !apimw.IsAdmin(ctx) {
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return false
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}
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profileID := apimw.GetProfileID(ctx)
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if profileID == "" {
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profileID = r.Header.Get("X-Profile-Id")
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}
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if profileID == "" || h.StoreProvider == nil {
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return true
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}
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store, err := h.StoreProvider.ForUser(ctx, apimw.GetUserID(ctx))
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if err != nil {
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return false // fail closed: the quota still applies
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}
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profile, err := store.GetProfile(ctx, profileID)
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if err != nil || profile == nil {
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return false
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}
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return profile.IsPrimary
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}
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// quotaExceededMessage turns a quota error into a user-facing message with the
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// limit and window when available.
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func quotaExceededMessage(err error) string {
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var qe *ai.QuotaExceededError
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if errors.As(err, &qe) {
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return fmt.Sprintf(
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"You've reached your transcription limit (%d per %s). Try again later or ask an admin to raise it.",
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qe.Limit, qe.Period)
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}
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return "You've reached your transcription limit. Try again later or ask an admin to raise it."
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}
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// HandleQuota reports the calling user's transcription quota usage, so the
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// player can show how many jobs they have left before they start one.
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// GET /api/v1/subtitles/ai/quota
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func (h *SubtitleAIHandler) HandleQuota(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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quota, err := h.service.TranscribeQuota(r.Context(), apimw.GetUserID(r.Context()), h.quotaExempt(r))
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if err != nil {
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slog.ErrorContext(r.Context(), "failed to load transcription quota", "component", "api", "error", err)
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writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "internal_error", "Failed to load transcription quota")
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return
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}
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, quota)
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}
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// HandleGetJob returns a job's current state. GET /api/v1/subtitles/ai/jobs/{job_id}
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func (h *SubtitleAIHandler) HandleGetJob(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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job, ok := h.loadAuthorizedJob(w, r)
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if !ok {
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return
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}
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{"job": job})
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}
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// HandleCancelJob cancels a job. POST /api/v1/subtitles/ai/jobs/{job_id}/cancel
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func (h *SubtitleAIHandler) HandleCancelJob(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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job, ok := h.loadAuthorizedJob(w, r)
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if !ok {
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return
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}
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if err := h.service.Cancel(r.Context(), job.ID); err != nil {
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writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "internal_error", "Failed to cancel job")
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return
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}
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
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}
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// HandleListJobs lists recent jobs for a media file.
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// GET /api/v1/subtitles/ai/jobs?media_file_id=N
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func (h *SubtitleAIHandler) HandleListJobs(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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mediaFileID, err := strconv.Atoi(r.URL.Query().Get("media_file_id"))
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if err != nil || mediaFileID <= 0 {
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writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid_id", "Invalid or missing media_file_id")
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return
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}
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if !authorizeMediaFileAccess(w, r, h.FileAuthorizer, mediaFileID) {
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return
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}
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jobs, err := h.service.ListJobs(r.Context(), mediaFileID)
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if err != nil {
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writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "list_error", "Failed to list jobs")
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return
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}
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{"jobs": jobs})
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}
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// loadAuthorizedJob parses the job_id param, loads the job, and authorizes
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// access against its media file. It writes the error response on failure.
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func (h *SubtitleAIHandler) loadAuthorizedJob(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) (*ai.Job, bool) {
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id, err := strconv.ParseInt(chi.URLParam(r, "job_id"), 10, 64)
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if err != nil {
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writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid_id", "Invalid job ID")
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return nil, false
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}
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job, err := h.service.GetJob(r.Context(), id)
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if err != nil {
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if errors.Is(err, ai.ErrJobNotFound) {
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writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "not_found", "Job not found")
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return nil, false
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}
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writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "internal_error", "Failed to load job")
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return nil, false
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}
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if !authorizeMediaFileAccess(w, r, h.FileAuthorizer, job.MediaFileID) {
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return nil, false
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}
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return job, true
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}
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